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Current History

AUGUST, 1960

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Coming Next Month...

NATO AND FREE WORLD SECURITY

September, 1960

Concluding our 3-part series on maintaining free world security, our September issue evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of Nato. Is it possible to transform Nato into a federal world government? How effective is Nato as a deterrent to aggression in Europe? These and questions like these will be covered in the following 7 articles:

THE SHAPE OF NATO by *Richard W. Van Alstyne*, Professor of History, University of Southern California, and managing editor of "World Affairs Quarterly";

NATO'S STRATEGIC DILEMMAS by *Allan S. Nanes*, Assistant to the Deputy Director, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress;

NATO: CORNERSTONE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY by *Alvin J. Cottrell*, Research Associate, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, and co-author of "Protracted Conflict";

NATO, RUSSIA AND THE COLD WAR by *H. H. Fisher*, Professor of International Relations, San Francisco State College and author of "The Communist Revolution";

WESTERN EUROPE AND ATLANTIC UNITY by *Hans Kohn*, Professor of History, City College of New York, and author of "The Mind of Germany";

NATO AND THE UNITED NATIONS by *Ross N. Berkes*, Director of the School of International Relations, University of Southern California, and co-author of "The Diplomacy of India"; and

THE FALLACY OF WORLD FEDERALISM by *Gerard Mangone*, Professor of Political Science and International Law, Maxwell Graduate School, Syracuse University, and author of "The Idea and Practice of World Government."

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Current History

Vol. 39

August, 1960

No. 228

Is it feasible for the United States to initiate a federal world government now? Could such a government guarantee the peace and security of the free world? Here, eight articles examine the historical applications of the federal principle, searching for the answer to these questions. As our introductory article points out: "The evolution of means of communication and transport has increased the possible area of effective government. Development of such means since the middle of the twentieth century has probably for the first time in human history provided the material basis for world government in the literal sense." But, continues this specialist, "The moral basis . . . is still lacking."

Empires and World Governments Before 1918

By QUINCY WRIGHT

Professor of International Law, University of Virginia

The Concept

THE terms world government and world federation refer to forms of political organization among all or many states, more centralized than systems of states regulated by diplomacy, the balance of power, treaty guarantees, collective security, international organization, or confederation. In the latter forms of organization, central agencies, if they exist at all, operate mainly upon the member-states and primarily by recommendation, though they may have authority to coordinate or even order forces of the members for the purpose of preserving peace and enforcing legal obligations.

In federations and other more centralized forms of government, on the other hand, central agencies have legal authority backed by sufficient material and moral power to make law and to enforce it directly upon individuals within a narrower or wider range of subjects. The distribution of power in the case of a federation is defined in the constitution which is difficult to change and preserves much autonomy to the member states.

In a unified government, on the other hand, local units derive their authority from grant by the central government. The distinction between a system of states or an international organization on the one hand and a federation or unified government on the other is not absolute. Aspects of both can be found, for example, in the Holy Roman Empire of the middle ages, the German Empire of 1871, and even in the United Nations. Yet it is usually possible to say whether sovereignty in the sense of ultimate power to govern individuals resides in the member states or in the union as a whole. Only in the latter case can the whole properly be called a union, a federation, or a government.¹

In this sense there has never been a world government although writers have for millennia expressed a vision of such government or even expounded it in detailed plans. There have, however, been federations and empires governing the peoples of different

¹ Max Beloff, "Federalism and International Integration," *Yearbook of World Affairs*, London, 1959, pp. 202 ff; Quincy Wright, "Fundamental Problems of International Organization," Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, *Preliminary Report and Monographs*, 1942, pp. 253 ff.

cultures or nationalities extending sometimes over the entire area of a "civilization" in the sense used by such historians as Arnold Toynbee.

The distinction between a federation and an empire depends upon the relative importance of coercion and consent in the formation and functioning of the union. Empires have been formed by conquest and have usually required continuing coercion of unwilling peoples in many of the member nations, though a sense of loyalty to the whole may develop as it did in the ancient Roman Empire after the general extension of citizenship in the second century A.D. Federations, on the other hand, have been established by agreement of independent states and have functioned with their consent, though in no instance has coercion been wholly lacking in either the formation or functioning of such unions. The United States was formed by the Revolutionary War and maintained by the Civil War. Most historic unions of large size have been empires rather than federations.

Large scale unions have been studied from the points of view of the conditions making them possible, of historical trends and fluctuations, of theoretical ideas and constitutions, and of political and military action creating and maintaining them.

Sociological Foundations

Sociologists and political scientists recognize that the more peoples communicate with one another regularly and abundantly, the more they have or acquire similar values and technologies, the more they have been in the habit of cooperating for common ends, the more feasible it has been to unite them under a common government. Only when these conditions have existed in high degree has voluntary federation been possible.² An empire established by conquest may, if the government is sufficiently wise, gradually create these conditions by building loyalty to symbols of unity through education and propaganda, especially to the person of the ruler, often given a religious significance; by efficient administration and welfare activity benefitting the people; by permitting considerable autonomy to states, cultures and religions within the union; and by maintaining a sense of need for common defense against

external enemies.³ Rome did this with some success as did the renaissance monarchies of Europe which created nation-states from feudal principalities. Imperial governments, however, ruling over peoples of markedly different cultural characteristics or separated geographically, have usually failed, and, as a result, have faced minority, national and self determination movements, eventually breaking up the empire.

Sociologists have also concluded that the maximum size of an empire is limited by the available means of effective communication and transport from the center to the periphery. The Roman Empire was dependent upon the maintenance of paved roads, and the British Empire upon the maintenance of numerous ports and a large merchant marine and navy. Recent empires have understood the importance of radio and air communications. The inadequacy of means of communication caused the early collapse of the great Mongol Empire and the disintegration of the Indian, Arab and Holy Roman Empires of the middle ages. It is doubtful whether the United States, Canada and Australia could have maintained their continental federations if it had not been for the invention of the telegraph and the building of transcontinental railroads.

The evolution of means of communication and transport has increased the possible area of effective government. Development of such means since the middle of the twentieth century has probably for the first time in human history provided the *material* basis for world government in the literal sense.⁴ The *moral* basis for such government is still lacking.⁵

Historical Trends

Historians like Spengler and Toynbee have perceived a trend in each of the various "civilizations" which have appeared in world history, from many warring states, through

² Quincy Wright, *op. cit.*; Robert C. Angell, "International Communication and World Society," in *The World Community* (Q. Wright, ed.), University of Chicago Press, 1948, pp. 145 ff.; W. F. Ogburn, ed., *Technology and International Relations*, University of Chicago Press, 1949, pp. 28 ff. (Hornell Hart); 126 ff. (Robert Leigh); 174 ff. (Q. Wright).

³ Crane Brinton, *From Many One*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1948; Charles E. Merriam, *The Making of Citizens*, The University of Chicago Press, 1931.

⁴ Hornell Hart, "Technology and the Growth of Political Areas," in *Technology and International Relations* (W. F. Ogburn, ed.), University of Chicago Press, 1949, pp. 28 ff.

⁵ See above, notes 2, 3.

a process of integration, to a universal state or empire followed by disintegration and the rise of a new civilization. After the fall of the ancient Roman (Caesar), Indian, (Gupta), Chinese (Tang), and Arab (Abasside) empires, conquests by Germans, Vikings, Mongols, Moghuls and Turks in the middle ages established empires in Central Europe, Northern Europe, China, Siberia, Russia, India and the Middle East.

The modern period opened with the discoveries of America and Eastern Asia by Europeans, and the establishment of empires by the recently integrated kingdoms of Portugal, Spain, England, France and the Netherlands, in the Americas, the islands of the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, and ports along the coasts of Asia and Africa ready to expand inland whenever the weakness of the indigenous governments or mastery of the difficulties of inland transportation permitted. Spain, under Charles V and Philip II, France under Louis XIV and Napoleon, and Germany under Wilhelm II and Hitler tried without success to unify Western Europe. However, the Hapsburg and Hohenzollern empires in central Europe, the Ottoman Turks in the Near and Middle East, the Romanoffs in eastern Europe and Siberia, the Moghuls followed by the British in India, and the Manchus in China divided most of the Eurasian continent east of the Rhine from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries. In the late nineteenth century the revival of overseas imperialism was stimulated by the penetration of Africa and the weakening of the Chinese, Spanish and Ottoman empires, permitting further imperialistic expansion by Great Britain and France, and the acquisition of overseas empires by Germany, Italy, the United States and Japan.

The spirit of nationalism, however, manifested by the recognition of Switzerland and The Netherlands, and the break-up of the Holy Roman Empire during the Thirty Years War, and stimulated by the American and French Revolutions, initiated a new period of history and perhaps of universal civilization. Empires have been breaking up at an accelerating rate. Of 87 states (all but 5 members of the United Nations), 68 emerged from empires after the American Declaration of Independence. Some contemporary states, like Switzerland, the

United States, Germany, Mexico, Brazil, Canada, Australia, India and the Soviet Union, have united lesser states into federations, manifesting a larger nationalism, and recent developments in western Europe suggest the possibility of even broader federations.

Nationalism, however, led to internationalism, with the formation of permanent organizations to administer the great rivers of Europe in the Napoleonic period; to formation of universal and continental international unions in the mid-century, such as the Universal Postal Union, the International Telegraphic Union and the Pan American Union; and, in the twentieth century, to the more general international organizations of the Hague Conferences, the League of Nations, and the United Nations with its dozen specialized agencies. Modern history has therefore been characterized by the rise and fall of empires, with self determination of nation states, with the grouping of neighboring states of similar culture into federations, and with the entry of all states into regional and general international organizations.⁶

Philosophic Ideas

The vision of a universal society may have originated with the Egyptian Pharaoh Ikhnaton, who with his wife, Nefertite, ruled Egypt from 1375 to 1358 B.C. He sought unsuccessfully to establish monotheism in Egypt but his idea of a universal god and the brotherhood of man may have been the inspiration of Moses who established the great monotheistic religion of Judaism followed by Christianity and Islam, all of which anticipated a universal human community inspired by the true faith.⁷ Similar ideas may be found in Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism and Platonism, and the ideas of world citizenship and the equality of man were inherent in the concept of natural law of the Stoics, the medieval philosophers, the international publicists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the philosophers and statesmen of the eighteenth century age

⁶ Frederick L. Schuman, *The Commonwealth of Man*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1952, pp. 108 ff.; Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, University of Chicago Press, 1942, pp. 103 ff.; *Ibid.*, "Recognition and Self Determination," *Proceedings*, American Society of International Law, 1954, pp. 23 ff.

⁷ Schuman, *op. cit.* p. 84; Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations*, New York, Appleton Century Crofts, 1955, pp. 509 ff.

of enlightenment, including Thomas Jefferson. The humanists of the Renaissance like Erasmus and More, and the Deists of the eighteenth century had similar visions of the community of mankind.

Many writers went further and specified such a vision in definite plans for an organization of the world for peace. In the first decade of the fourteenth century, the poet Dante in his *De Monarchia*, Pope Boniface VIII in his *Bull Unum Sanctum*, and the Frenchman Pierre Dubois in his *De Recuperatione Terre Sancte* expounded such a union from the points of view respectively of the Emperor, the Pope, and the Princes. The *Plaint of Peace* by Erasmus early in the sixteenth century aimed more at the stimulation of opinion than at the elaboration of a government to maintain peace.

Official steps towards the organization of peace were to be found in a plan originated by Henry the Eighth of England and his Minister Wolsey, achieving a short-lived treaty between England and France in 1518, and in the Grand Design of King Henry IV of France expounded after his death by his Minister Sully with the comment that it would have been realized except for the assassination of the King in 1610.

The first plan of universal organization elaborated in detail in the modern period was that of Emeric Crucé whose *Nouveau Cynée* was published in 1623. Taking inspiration from Plutarch's *Life of Cyneas*, who told his royal master Pyrrhus that conquest even though successful would contribute nothing either to his own or to his people's happiness, Crucé proposed a federation of European, Asian and African princes with an assembly of ambassadors to settle controversies and to enforce peace. The inclusion of Christian and non-Christian princes, the fixing of their order of precedence (the Pope first, the Sultan second, the Emperor third, the King of France fourth, the King of Spain fifth, and the next place contested between the Kings of Persia, China, Prester John, the Precop of Tartary and the Grand Duke of Muscovy, followed by the Kings of Great Britain, Poland, Denmark, Sweden, Japan, Morocco, the Great Moghul and other monarchs from India and Africa), and the emphasis upon the territorial integrity of states and upon educational and economic prob-

lems were among the novel characteristics of this plan.

Similar plans by William Penn in the late seventeenth century, the Abbé St. Pierre in the early eighteenth century, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Jeremy Bentham and Emanuel Kant in the late eighteenth century, influenced the proposals of the Czar Alexander the First, during the Napoleonic period, to make proposals which eventuated in the Holy Alliance and the system of diplomatic conferences after peace was established in Vienna in 1815. This Alliance lasted for seven years under the initiative of the British Foreign Minister, Lord Castlereagh, and the Austrian Minister Metternich with sufficient effectiveness to be called by its historian, Allison Phillips, "The Confederation of Europe."

Later in the nineteenth century other plans inspired by the peace societies were projected by the Americans William Ladd (1840) and William Jay (1842), the German jurist Johann Caspar Bluntschli (1878), the Scotch jurist James Lorimer (1884), and others. These ideas, the popularization of international arbitration after the Alabama award, and the pacifist propaganda of Baron Bertha Von Suttner, as well as his budgetary problems, inspired Czar Nicholas II to call a peace conference at the Hague in 1899 resulting in a Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, and contemplating a succession of similar conferences to codify international law. Another such conference was held in 1907. The series was ended by World War I, after which more effective international organization was accepted by most states in the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, and the United Nations. Theory and practice had moved toward the organization of peace for six centuries, but, since the first plans of Dante and Boniface, more in the direction of confederation and international organization than of federation or government.⁸

The Greatest States

The largest actual states in human history appear to have been the Empires of Great Britain, the Mongols, Russia, Spain and China. Each of these at their greatest extent

⁸ Sylvester J. Hemleben, *Plans for World Peace through Six Centuries*, University of Chicago Press, 1943; John A. R. Marriott, *The Commonwealth versus Anarchy*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1939.

governed over five million square miles of territory, over 10 per cent of the land area of the world (49 million square miles) if the uninhabitable Antarctic continent and Arctic islands are excluded.⁹

The largest of these empires was that of Great Britain which, beginning with the settlement in Jamestown in 1607, expanded steadily in America, Asia, Australia, Africa and the islands of the world except for the loss of the North American colonies in 1776. In the early twentieth century its total land area was over 13 million square miles and its population over 400 million, a quarter of the world in both area and population. All this vast area and population was subject in legal theory to the King and the Parliament in London. With democratic institutions at home, Britain had granted a high degree of self government, after the experience of 1776, to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and some of the Crown Colonies.

After World War I, dominion status developed into complete independence under international law for the major overseas possessions, first those of European settlement and, since World War II, those of Asian and African populations, until today "The Commonwealth" consists of a dozen states bound only by ties of tradition, convenience and sentiment. The government in London continues to govern the United Kingdom and some colonies, protectorates and trusteeships in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific with an area of less than two million square miles and a population of less than 100 million.

The second largest government in history was the Mongol Empire of Jhenghis and Kublai Khan which extended in the thirteenth century from Mongolia to Siberia, Russia and China, at its greatest extent including some nine million square miles of territory, nearly one-fifth of the inhabitable world with a population of some 100 million, perhaps a quarter of the world's population of the time. In contrast with the sea empire of Britain, this was a land empire controlled by nomadic herdsmen maintaining communication over vast distances by horse rather than ship. It was never closely integrated and was short-lived, rapidly disintegrating after the death of the energetic conquerors.

Its center was China, the vast areas of Siberia and Russia being at the time thinly populated, and when visited by Marco Polo at its height it presented a picture of high culture and great power. This vast area, with the East European satellites added, and constituting more than one-fifth of the habitable territory of the globe and more than one-third of the world's population, is today closely integrated under the Communist party and constitutes the nearest approach to world government in human history.

The third largest state is Russia which, from the Grand Duchy of Muscovy, began to conquer the Mongol states, successors to the great Mongol Empire, in the sixteenth century. Conquest proceeded under Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great, toward the Black and Baltic Seas and, in the following century through Siberia to the Pacific until by 1900 Czar Nicholas II ruled over 8.7 million square miles of territory and some 170 million subjects, about one tenth of the world's population of the time. The Czar, whose title is the Russian equivalent of Caesar, considered his empire the third Rome of which, as head of the orthodox church, he was both temporal and spiritual ruler. His government was centralized, religious and autocratic, and continued pressing for new territories in Manchuria, Persia and Turkey, before the revolution of 1917. Under the new religion of communism and the federal constitution of the Soviet Union, Russia has continued to expand in both Europe and Asia.

The fourth largest state was Spain which, after Ferdinand and Isabella had driven out the Moors and united the Peninsula, began an overseas empire following the discoveries by Columbus and others, inspired by Christian faith, the quest for gold, and the spirit of adventure. Charles V became Holy Roman Emperor in 1520, governing in Europe, Spain, the Austrian Empire and the Low Countries, and in the New World, Mexico, Central America, the islands of the Caribbean, South America except Brazil, the Philippine Islands, and small areas and islands in North Africa, a total area of 5.4 million square miles with a population of some 40 million, perhaps one tenth of the

⁹ These figures are from Hornell Hart, *op. cit.*, and the *Britannica Book of the Year*, 1960, "Population and Areas of Countries of the World."

world's population of the time. Charles soon gave the Austrian Empire to his brother Ferdinand. The Spanish Empire lost the Low Countries in the late sixteenth century, was weakened by the Thirty Years War in the seventeenth century, was conquered by Napoleon and lost most of Latin America in the revolutions of the early nineteenth century. During three centuries of greatness it was a centralized empire, dominated by Roman Catholicism, practicing restrictive principles of trade; almost continually at war in Europe, but governing its overseas colonies with considerable efficiency.

The fifth largest state is China which (since the Ts'ing Dynasty, which unified the decaying Chou Empire in 225 B.C. and built the Great Wall along its northern frontier), has continued united under a succession of dynasties: The Han, Sui, Tang, Sung, Yuan (Mongol), Ming, and Ch'ing (Manchu). This Empire generally expanded and enjoyed internal peace but with periods of revolution, division and bloodshed between dynasties, until the Manchu Empire at the end of the eighteenth century governed directly about 5 million square miles of territory including the 18 provinces and the outlying areas of Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet, with a population of some 200 million, over one-fifth of the world's population of the time. It also received tribute from Korea, Liuchiu, Burma, Nepal, Laos, Siam and the Sulu Archipelago of the Philippines.¹⁰ It was weakened by European invasion in the nineteenth century and was threatened by partition after defeat by Japan in 1895.

Since the Republic, established by Sun Yat Sen in 1911, and a period of civil war, international war, and division, it has recovered under the Kuo Min Tang Party of Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist regime of Mao Tse-tung. Until the Republic, the Chinese Empire was in theory centralized and united by Confucianism, respect for learning, the family system, and the symbol of the Emperor, head of the ancient religion as long as he wore "the Mantle of Heaven." China was ruled in the main effectively by a civil service, selected by examinations. In practice there has been considerable decentralization conforming to the local sentiment of the provinces and the outlying areas. The

recent governments with democratic or Communist ideologies have tended toward greater centralization. The present government at Peking, in alliance with the Soviet Union, has probably the most centralized government in human history, ruling 650 million people, nearly a quarter of the world's population, and occupying nearly a tenth of the world's area.

These five greatest states, it will be noticed, were all empires established by conquest and colonization. Russia and China with compact territories in the greatest land mass on earth alone survive and are today in alliance under the dominance of the Communist party. Both have usually been ruled by autocracies and their present regimes are centralized under one-party rule though with some federal characteristics. The union of these vast areas in the Mongol Empire of the fifteenth century was short-lived and feebly organized. Whether their union today under the Communist party will be more enduring remains to be seen.

The overseas empires of Great Britain and Spain, on the other hand, have disintegrated into many nation states. Great Britain, a constitutional monarchy at home, extended much home rule to colonies and dominions from the first and eventually cooperated in promoting their self-determination as independent states. Spain, an autocratically and religiously oriented monarchy, ruled its colonies with greater centralized authority for three centuries but was unable to resist their demands for independence when weakened by the hazards of European power-politics and a decline in military and economic efficiency.

Second Magnitude States

The five states next in size (omitting Canada and Australia which did not become independent until after the First World War and, which though large in area, are small in population), have been the Portuguese Empire, the French Empire, the United States of America, the Ottoman Empire and Brazil.

Portugal, like Spain, inspired by missionary zeal for Catholic Christianity as well as by economic interests, began to acquire ter-

¹⁰ Quincy Wright, *Legal Problems in the Far Eastern Conflict*, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941, pp. 32 ff.

ritory in Africa under Prince Henry the Navigator in the middle of the fifteenth century and expanded continuously for over three centuries except for the period of union with Spain from 1580 to 1640. It acquired territories on both the west and east coasts of Africa, in Brazil, ports in India and China, and portions of Indonesia, constituting at the end of the eighteenth century a total area of over 4 million square miles with a population of over 40 million. Portugal lost Indonesia to the Dutch in the seventeenth century and, with the independence of Brazil in 1825, the Portuguese Empire was reduced to the African territories of Angola and Mozambique, Timor in Indonesia, Goa and some small enclaves in India, Macau in China, the Azores and other islands in the Atlantic. Portugal ruled its empire autocratically but has extended citizenship without racial distinction to the literates of its colonies which it regards as provinces of Portugal.

France began overseas expansion in the late sixteenth century, acquiring Canada and the Louisiana Territory in North America at the time of Louis XIV, the grand monarch. These and claims in India were lost as a result of the British victory in the Seven Years War which ended in 1763. In the nineteenth century France again acquired a great empire under Napoleon, and later a vast empire in north and central Africa and Southeast Asia, which together with insular possessions in the Caribbean, the Pacific and the Indian Ocean constituted at the beginning of the twentieth century, an empire of over 3.5 million square miles with a population of over 80 million. France maintained a centralized administration inspired by the *Mission Civilisatrice*, and incorporated the older colonies as departments of France, gradually extending French citizenship to the literate as did Portugal. These policies, however, failed to maintain unity, as the sentiment of nationalism developed in the colonies. Since World War II, France has adopted a policy more like that of Great Britain, and the colonies have been becoming independent states, some within and some outside of the loose "French community."

The United States grew from the Declaration of Independence in 1776 in area (ex-

cept for the recognition of the Philippines independence in 1946), population, wealth and constitutional solidarity except for the four years of Civil War in the middle of the nineteenth century. By 1900, with Alaska, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Hawaii and other islands of the Pacific added to its continental land mass extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific, it had an area of 3.7 million square miles and a population of 90 million, which has subsequently grown to 180 million. It has continued to grow in power position and influence in the world under a democratic and federal government and occupies a permanent seat in the Security Council of the United Nations in company with Russia, Great Britain, France and China.

The Ottoman Empire grew from the conquests of the Osmanli Tribe of Turks from Central Asia beginning in the thirteenth century. The tribe invaded the decaying Byzantine Empire in Asia Minor, taking over the religious leadership of Islam from the decaying Arab Caliph, capturing Constantinople in 1453, and subsequently conquering the Balkans, Greece, Hungary, southern Russia, parts of Austria, Syria, Arabia, Egypt and North Africa as far as Morocco, a total of 3.5 million square miles, slightly smaller than the United States, with a population in the seventeenth century of some 40 million. Though autocratic, with power based on the professional military force of the Janissaries, the Ottoman Sultans under the "Millet" system gave a large measure of home rule to non-Muslim religious groups within the empire. Internal weakening of the empire resulted in grants of autonomy to outlying areas, followed by the conquests of European powers in North Africa and the independence of Greece and the Balkans in the nineteenth century and of the Arab states in the twentieth, reducing Turkey to Asia Minor and a small area in Europe including Istanbul. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Turkey was a great power, threatening the Hapsburg Empire and Christendom.

Brazil separated from Portugal in 1825 but was governed as an empire until 1890 when it became a federal republic with an area of 3.3 million square miles, slightly smaller than the United States, and a population which has grown to 60 million.

Other Large States

Other large states in order of geographical magnitude include the short-lived Greek Empire of Alexander the Great (2.5 million square miles), the Persian Empire of Cyrus and Darius (2.3 million square miles), the Roman Empire of the Antonine Caesars (2 million square miles), the Arab Caliphates of the Middle Ages (2 million square miles), the short-lived empire of Tamerlane (2 million square miles), the modern overseas German empire (1.2 million square miles), the Maurya, Gupta and Moghul Empires of India (1 million square miles), the modern Dutch empire (850 thousand square miles), the short-lived French empire of Napoleon (750 thousand square miles), the ancient Egyptian empire after the Hyksos invasion (690 thousand square miles), the empire of the Incas in Peru (600 thousand square miles), the League of the Iroquois (560 thousand square miles), the Holy Roman Empire of the Middle Ages (544 thousand square miles), the empire of the Aztecs in Mexico (500 thousand square miles), the Empire of Charlemagne (450 thousand square miles), and the Akkadian Empire of Sargon (250 thousand square miles).

These states, of which all but one were empires, grew up in widely scattered times and places, and among peoples of very different cultures. They exhibited a great variety of forms of government. Alexander the Great's conquests, after his father Philip of Macedon had conquered Greece, extended into Asia Minor, Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, Persia and Western Pakistan during eleven years (334-323 B.C.). He assumed characteristics of an Oriental monarch, deifying himself, but spread Greek civilization throughout his vast empire, which, however, broke up on his death.

Charlemagne's conquests under the flag of Christendom in the eighth century, following those of his grandfather Charles Martel, united France, western Germany and northern Italy. He had himself crowned Roman Emperor at Aachen in the year 800 with the sanction and cooperation of the Pope, but provided for the division of his empire among his three sons on his death in 814. The Holy Roman Empire which survived was a loose confederation with an elected emperor, whose power depended on the land of which

he was king and his relations with the Papacy. The Pope exercised more real authority as head of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy and wielding the powers of excommunication and interdict. The theoretical unity of the European world in the Middle Ages under the spiritual power of the Pope and the temporal power of the Emperor was qualified in practice by their continuous rivalry, and the hostilities of the kings and barons theoretically subject to both.

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries when European energy was devoted to crusading in the Middle East and Christian unity was stimulated by the common cause, Europe achieved considerable unity and peace through the effective maintenance by the Church of the peace and truce of God. This unity was weakened by the rise of monarchs, utilizing gun powder and Machiavelian political science, by the renaissance of classicism, and the reformation dividing Christendom. The effort of the Emperor to restore this unity in the seventeenth century resulted in the Thirty Years War, ended by the Peace of Westphalia which recognized national territorial sovereignties, thus destroying the Holy Roman Empire, although it continued as a form until ended by Napoleon in 1806.

Timur the lame, known as Tamerlane, claimed to be a descendant of Jhengis Khan. With the mission to spread Islam, after organizing Kashgar in central Asia, he invaded Russia, Persia, the Caucasus, Mesopotamia, India, Syria, Asia Minor, and received the submission of Egypt. His career, marked by the utmost brutality, lasted from 1380 to 1404. He was on an expedition to subdue China when he died in 1405, dividing his empire between his two sons. His conquests were never organized, and left less permanent results than the short-lived empires of Alexander, Charlemagne and Napoleon.

Napoleon's empire at his greatest magnitude united Spain, France, the low countries, Switzerland, and much of Italy and Germany. He spread ideas of the French revolution across western Europe. Early in his career he reannexed Louisiana but soon sold it to the United States, lost Haiti by rebellion, and briefly invaded Egypt. His European empire broke up on his defeat at Waterloo.

The overseas empire of the Netherlands,

begun in the seventeenth century, and that of Germany which began in the late nineteenth century after German unity was achieved by Bismarck, resembled the overseas empires of Spain, Portugal, Great Britain and France, though smaller. Both have broken up with the rise of nationalism, as have the twentieth century empires of Italy and Japan. Defeat of Germany in the first World War and of Italy and Japan in World War II accelerated this process. The system of international supervision of the process of colonial self-determination by the mandate and trustee systems instituted a consciousness of universal responsibility for disintegrating empires and emerging nations.

The ancient Egyptian empire achieved its greatest area under Thutmos III, in the middle of the fifteenth century B.C. Thutmos extended his domain to the Sudan, Ethiopia, Libya, Syria and Mesopotamia, and explored the coast of the Red Sea and East Africa. This great empire lasted for several centuries, including the reign of Ikhnaton, who tried to introduce monotheism into Egypt. A Mesopotamian empire achieved considerable size under Hammurabi of Babylon in the eighteenth century B.C., Sargon II of Assyria in the eighth century B.C., and Nebuchadnezzar of Chaldea in the sixth century B.C., but the largest and oldest of all seems to have been that of Sargon I of Akkadia from 2356 to 2300 B.C. This empire extended throughout Mesopotamia and into Syria and even Egypt. The Persian empire was largest under Darius about 500 B.C. It extended into Mesopotamia, Syria and Anatolia and attempted the conquest of Greece unsuccessfully. All of these ancient middle eastern empires combined temporal and religious authority in an emperor who ruled autocratically.

The Roman Empire reached its greatest extent under Caracalla in the third century A.D. when it surrounded the Mediterranean Sea, including Italy, Spain and France to the Rhine; southeastern Europe to the Danube; the middle east to the Syrian Desert; and Egypt and North Africa to the Sahara. As with the Oriental empires, Roman emperors augmented their authority by deification. The ancient empires of Egypt, Mesopotamia and Persia lasted for centuries and continue today in the modern states of

Egypt, Iraq and Iran, but the Roman empire, which continues in the modern state of Italy, has been more influential. It inspired the idea of world government in the Holy Roman Empire of the middle ages and in the efforts toward world unity by the Hapsburgs, the Bourbons, the Romanoffs, the Hohenzollerns and such conquerors as Charlemagne and Napoleon. It grew up gradually with constitutional institutions after the conquest of Carthage during the republic. It was expanded to the east in the late republic, to the north by Caesar, to Asia Minor by Augustus and Hadrian, and even to Britain south of Scotland.

The empire was successful in keeping the peace for almost a century during the period of the Antonine Caesars, dominated by the spirit of Stoicism manifested in the meditations of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius. Decay set in after the Empire was divided by Diocletian and Christianity was adopted as the state religion by Constantine at the beginning of the fourth century A.D. The Western empire was taken over by German tribes in the sixth century, but the Byzantine empire of the east lasted with diminishing area until the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453. The empire extended Stoic philosophy, Roman law and, in its late days, Christianity, and permitted a great growth of population probably to over 100 million at its height.¹¹

India, though a compact area with natural frontiers, has been divided by religion, language and culture and politically united only rarely. The Maurya empire of Asoka after the invasions of Alexander the Great united most of India in the third century B.C., introduced Buddhism and maintained peace for a century. The Gupta dynasty in the fourth century A.D. united much of India under a revived Hinduism. The Moghul empire, established by Babur in the sixteenth century, extended into all of India except the extreme south at the time of the Great Akbar, a contemporary of Queen Elizabeth. Although Akbar tried to synthesize the religions of India, the effect of his rule was to spread Muslim art, architecture and religion. At the end of the seventeenth century Au-

¹¹ Quincy Wright, "The Historic Circumstances of Enduring Peace," *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1942, vol. 3, pp. 361-373; *Ibid.*, *A Study of War*, op. cit., pp. 467.

rungzeb, the last of the great Moghuls, and a devout Muslim, persecuted Hinduism and aroused intense hatred among the Sikhs and Brahmins, weakening the empire, which gave way to the British Raj in the eighteenth century.

The Arab Caliphates engaged in conquest from the time of Mohammed, and achieved maximum size under the Abbasides with their capital in Baghdad. The Caliph Harun Al Rashid, famous listener to the thousand and one Arabian Nights, was a contemporary of Charlemagne, with whom he corresponded. His empire extended from Spain to Persia and encouraged science and learning. The Caliphs combined imperial and religious authority and ruled autocratically as agents of God whose law was revealed in the Koran. Administration was in fact decentralized, with considerable authority delegated to local rulers, but less so than in the Holy Roman Empire.

The pre-Columbian American empires of the Incas and Aztecs developed from ancient civilizations were based upon agriculture and the use of pottery, but without horse, wheel or metals. They were at their heights at the time of the Spanish conquests in the early sixteenth century. They ruled autocratically, the Incas in a highly centralized empire, the ruler of which was regarded as a deity. He controlled not only the government but also the economy of the country, based upon a

highly developed system of terraced agriculture. The Aztec rulers also were supported by religious beliefs. These demanded frequent human sacrifices.

The five, later six, nations of the Iroquois, though less developed economically and culturally, formed a league in the sixteenth century. Their control extended from northern New York to most of the area north of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi after they had acquired firearms from the Dutch. The number of individuals in the six nations was never large, as the hunting culture of the area could not support a large population. They still exist with a certain solidarity in Canada and the United States and at one time sought to initiate an action against Canada in the League of Nations on the alleged ground of treaty violation. This League constitutes a rare example of early political organization of a federalistic character.

Conclusion

The foregoing summary of world government before 1918 suggests that the size of states has grown with the technology of communication and transport, that compact land states have been more enduring than sea empires, that centralized imperial rule has been more common than democratic federation, that most empires have rested on religious as well as a temporal sanctions, and that only a few have maintained internal peace for any great length of time. All have engaged in external wars, and success in such wars has been an instrument both of expansion and of internal solidarity and peace.

A universal state in the literal sense would differ from any of these large governments because the pressure of an external enemy would not function either to unite or to dismember. The problems of such a union would be entirely internal, and experience suggests that the development of local nationalisms, especially among geographically separated peoples, would require a relatively loose organization. Actually, universal political organizations, though visioned by religious leaders, philosophers and statesmen, did not exist until the twentieth century, and these have been international organizations rather than federations—leagues rather than governments.

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"Practically every man and woman on earth [should be made] aware of the great and heartwarming benefits, of the hopes for goals eagerly desired, which would be held out to them and their children if the nations and their governments were persuaded to accept the two inescapably interdependent objectives of disarmament under world law plus a world mutual development fund." If a plan is put forward when the "moment of history" arrives, "it could exert great persuasive power."

Blueprint for a Peaceful World

BY PAUL SHIPMAN ANDREWS

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THE ANCIENT Greeks called a crucial moment the *Peripatoea*, the change of fortune or circumstance which marked the turning point of a drama, and led on, as men might use or misuse or lose the opportunity, to a happy ending or to disaster. One can foresee such a moment in history. If it comes—and it could come relatively soon—it will present to certain nations and their leaders both a challenge and a responsibility such as perhaps has not been offered before to any. For then, by their acts or failure to act, they will inescapably be forced to choose: by their acts or failure to act they will wisely seize and use or meanly lose a moment which could prove to hold the one best hope of peace ever so far vouchsafed to mankind.

One can see that moment of history developing in its earlier stages even now. We, the peoples of the nations, have seen confer-

ence after conference between the two great adversary power groups fail to agree on the essentials of a dependable peace; fail to agree even on partial steps toward that goal. We have noted how such conferences have been used, it seems to us, more for propaganda than for serious negotiation. We have observed how the tensions in crisis areas are made to mount almost to the breaking point, then to fall, then to rise again, as the arms race continues. We have learned to recognize the deep mutual distrust and suspicion between the two great adversaries which seems to make it impossible for either to accept a substantial peace proposal offered by the other; we understand the fear that acceptance would be a propaganda defeat and mean loss of "face." We are deeply cynical about the prospects of such conferences. We are forced to doubt that a disarmament conference or a summit conference can achieve a durable peace. As for further conferences, perhaps it is not too much to say that our only faith in them is that they too will fail.

Meantime, men and women the world over are growing more and more aware that the danger of another great war is real and grave. To be sure, it is disagreeable to have the subject brought up in conversation. It is more pleasant to brush it under the rug. But the hard facts of international life are gradually forcing themselves into our consciousness. To be sure, we know that the United States and its friends and allies do not want a great war. We believe—or at least most informed men believe—that Russia

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does not want and cannot afford a great war from which China alone would profit and does not consider such a war either a correct or a necessary means for pursuing its aim of dominating a communized world.

But we are fast learning the "facts of life," for instance, that arms races in the past have always ended in the wars they sought to avert or postpone, often when neither side desired a war at the time. We remember Pearl Harbor. Whether we consider the Suez decision right or wrong, we remember certain brutally blunt threats of war at that time and we realize that a great war may have been very close. We are coming to understand why it is that arms races lead to war; that a great war could be all too easily touched off by the recklessness, the gambling instinct, or the misjudgment of a national leader or even a subordinate; by a small war exploding into the unwanted great one; by sheer accident, by the irresponsible act of some dictator whose country may obtain nuclear weapons.

With each increase of tension between the Great Adversaries, with each threat even of a small war anywhere in the world, we are learning more and more to fear war, to be interested in a truly dependable peace, to know that building up armaments, though necessary, in the end can give us no security against war. We are learning to accept disarmament of all nations plus the other essentials of a durable peace as "respectable" and likely to afford to all nations a security against war and aggression which none now possesses, and to be willing, finally, to learn what the elements are which are indispensable for such a peace.

When one or a number of future peace conferences fail to agree or fall short of agreeing on the elements essential for such a peace; when the Great Adversaries are still deadlocked in mutual distrust; when disillusionment and cynicism turn to hopelessness; when men realize even more fully than they do today what it would mean to them and their children if the vast sums now spent for non-productive armaments could be released for constructive purposes in order to help raise men's standards of living everywhere in the world, for drastic tax reductions and other benefits, then the demand for peace and a better life, it seems clear, is likely to

become insistent and powerful throughout the world.

This, then, could be the "Moment of History." If at this time an adequate peace proposal containing the requirements for a truly dependable peace were put forward in such a way and by such sources that it could avoid the mutual distrust of the two great adversaries, and cost them no loss of "face" in accepting it, it might be the turning point away from the road which now seems to be leading the world towards war.

Rule of World Law

But before discussing the possible sponsorship of such a peace proposal, it seems best to try to specify what it should contain.

On February 18, 1960, Secretary of State Herter offered an extremely important proposal, evidently carefully planned both as to what it contained and what it wisely omitted. He advocated, in a disarmed world, a United Nations Police Force and Tribunals. He must of course be fully aware that such a police force would not only be irresponsible but unworkable and that the rights of citizens would not be safe unless the police were guided and limited by a world law covering the field of war-prevention and disarmament. It is equally clear that the police must be able to act upon individuals—to arrest individuals (no matter how high their position) reasonably accused of violating or conspiring to violate this world war prevention law.

Americans will remember that our country's constitutional convention of 1787 which formed our government gave very great weight to this power to act on individuals. The reason, of course, is that if a peace-keeping authority, a nation or world security authority or a strengthened United Nations cannot act on individuals, then its only means of keeping the peace would be to go to war against any nation or state which violated the war prevention law. Thus, war could not be prevented, and any war prevention law which did not contain the power to act on individuals (strictly of course within the field of that law and not otherwise) would be a mockery.

Tribunals, too, would exercise arbitrary power unless directed and limited by a war prevention law which they were bound to

apply, like courts in all countries where laws are means of administering justice. They should have compulsory jurisdiction to try national leaders or other individuals.

But how are violations of the world law, or conspiracies to violate it, to be detected? Not unlike the detective force in a city, or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, there must be an adequate organization to discover and report failure to comply with the world war prevention law or violations of it. This inspection or "control" force must of course have adequate access at all times to all facilities and installations in every country which might become the means of violating the world law.

Obviously there must be an Executive or perhaps "Director General" to direct the police and inspection forces and to be head of the United Nations disarmament system, and to perform the usual functions of an executive. He would be responsible to a legislative body.

This legislative body of parliament, competent in the field of war prevention, non-aggression and disarmament, would have the power to make or amend the world law in this field as changing conditions might require, subject to judicial review. Just as the Supreme Court of the United States may set aside laws which violate the Federal Constitution, so, it seems to the writer, enactments of this legislative body which might be contrary to certain parts of the world law limiting and circumscribing the competence of the parliament, and so forth, should be set aside by the world tribunals, which would sit in various parts of every country, wherever cases might arise, with a right of appeal to a supreme world tribunal with expanded powers, which might be the successor of the present International Court of Justice at the Hague. The parliament would furnish a means of amending the world war-prevention law which, though properly safeguarded, would be less cumbersome and unworkable than to require that this be done by agreement of all the nations.

These new powers and institutions added to the United Nations will cost something, though of course far less than the vast sums now spent for armaments. But no nation and particularly no great nation must have the power to refuse its annual contribution;

if it did, it would in effect have a veto upon the entire disarmament system and could cripple or destroy it. Therefore the United Nations must have the power to require each nation to supply its annual quota of appropriations for the support of the disarmament system.

Finally, in a disarmed world in which war will have been forbidden as a means of settling international disputes, a means must be provided for settling peaceably political, non-justiciable disputes not covered by the world law. This suggests a set of special tribunals, sometimes called "equity tribunals," charged with this duty. These new powers and institutions, and the Charter amendments needed to invest the United Nations with them, are studied in *World Peace through World Law*, by Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn (Harvard University Press, 1958), a book which seems to this writer to demonstrate that peace under world law, with disarmament, under a strengthened United Nations is entirely feasible and could be workable.

This book has had a significant impact in most countries of the world, and is the "bible" for the United World Federalists, Inc., in the United States, and for the World Association of World Federalists which coordinates similar movements in some 34 countries. Its introduction, also published as a separate pamphlet of some 50 pages, summarizes the gist of the book.

Step By Step Disarmament

At this point, it should be made clear that the plan for a proposed strengthened United Nations does NOT imply unilateral disarmament nor the weakening of any nation or group of nations in relation to any adversary; it contemplates the disarmament of all nations in parallel stages, as shown in the book referred to above, so planned and measured that at no stage will any nation or group gain an advantage in military strength as against its adversaries. This step-by-step disarmament procedure would take some 12 years. Moreover, violations of the disarmament agreement by any nation at any stage would be inspected, discovered, checked or controlled. Still further, until a satisfactory disarmament agreement has been put into effect, it would not only be wise but an indispensable part of the plan that military power

to retaliate and thus to deter war and aggression should be maintained. If for instance the Western allies should allow themselves to become so weak that Russia had nothing to fear from them there would be proportionately less inducement for the Kremlin to accept enforceable disarmament. Doubtless the Russians would feel the same way in reverse! But this being so, it seems to the writer the best and perhaps the only way so far proposed for making taxpayers at least in the Western and democratic countries willing to spend adequately for armaments for defense.

If men are asked to pay heavy taxes for armaments, with no prospect except of paying more or less the same taxes next year and the year after that and so on, endlessly, they continue paying for years, and the war that they pay to prevent never comes. Men become used to living under tensions, and after a while, bored. The danger of war comes to seem unreal. They would so much rather have money to spend for their businesses and their pleasures than pay it in taxes to the government for weapons which become obsolete as soon as they are ready for use, and then pay again for more such weapons.

A Moral and Religious Concern

But there is more. The "concern" (a fine Quaker word) which we have learned to feel for our fellow citizens and neighbors in the same community extends only very little to unhappy millions in underdeveloped and underprivileged areas of the world. For these, we do not feel the same sense of responsibility. And yet there are hundreds of millions of unhappy people in underprivileged areas, living today in hunger, misery, disease, destitution, degradation and a growing angry despair who feel poignantly this lack of concern on the part of the richer peoples and resent it. All too easily, they can be persuaded that the Western nations are interested only in making money out of them and exploiting them.

Yet if we believe in the faiths which we profess, these unhappy millions are our brothers and sisters. There is a moral and religious duty to do what we can to help them toward a better standard of living, not by charitable gifts, but by wise investment in constructive projects that will help them to help themselves. In addition, one of the

most explosive political facts in the world today is the misery of hundreds of millions of human beings whose life expectancy at birth is in the neighborhood of 30 years and whose children (whom they too love) die like flies. These men and women are rapidly learning that abject misery is not the fate of people in the comparatively few richer Western nations. They are more and more insistently demanding a better life for themselves and their children. This desire, and the desire for political freedom and sovereign independence which they confidently believe would be a step towards a better life, are also explosive forces and political facts of rapidly increasing significance. The peoples of these underprivileged areas will turn toward the nation or group of nations which seems to them to give them hope, and to show genuine concern for their welfare as human beings, just as we ourselves would do.

The peoples of these underprivileged areas, within the not too distant future, will almost certainly be able to tip the balance of power and thus to affect and perhaps control the fate of mankind. One cannot buy their friendship with dollars nor ask them to be happy about the profit which too often in the past Western businesses have taken from these countries, too often leaving little behind to help raise their standard of living. It is hard for us of the prosperous West to realize with our hearts in what misery unhappy millions live.

Yet quite suddenly in this decade of the 1960's it seems to the writer that we of the West are being called upon to put into practical application, for the first time in history, some of the teachings of the faiths we profess, some of things which so far we have learned to apply only to our own communities and to a degree to our own countries.

Sayings like "Give and it shall be given unto you," "Without vision the people perish," and "A house divided against itself cannot stand" are the wisdom not of Christianity and Judaism alone, but of mankind. Today we are learning—and pray God we shall not have to learn in too harsh a school—that such words as these are not just pleasantries to be murmured in church or temple, but have become also hard, inescapable rules of life and conduct for men and nations. To watch with cool indifference as new grave-

stones appeared one by one in the graveyard of murdered nations, to turn our backs when a conflagration threatened our neighbor's house, to close our ears to the voices of hunger, disease, destitution and despair, anywhere in the world, was always a sterile thing; now, it is dangerous as well as selfish and immoral.

The proposed plan for a dependable peace with disarmament, under world law, does not turn the richer nations back into an outmoded, self-defeating selfishness. On the contrary, it releases vast sums out of the *savings* from eliminated war budgets to give millions of our brothers and sisters the hope of a gradually rising living standard for themselves and their children. The fact that we would have to make no sacrifice whatever to do this but that we would pay for it out of a mere fraction of the savings from war budgets when eliminated need not prevent this from being an act of brotherhood, if, but only if, we do it with our hearts! It is a critically important thing politically as well as spiritually, that we should do this.

Sovereignty Undiminished

This system of peace under world law with disarmament, further, would NOT diminish the sovereign control of any nation over its own concerns. On the contrary, it would maintain and even enhance the power of each nation to exercise its sovereignty. The reasons why this is so are plain.

In the first place, the sovereign powers to be transferred to a strengthened United Nations would be relatively slight. They would be only those powers necessary to enable the United Nations to prevent war. It should be remembered that by signing the United Nations Charter (and in many cases by other treaties) most nations have already relinquished the sovereign *right* to launch a war. A dependable peace, however, requires that in addition they relinquish the *power* to break their solemn promises not to do this. Note that the powers and institutions to be vested in a strengthened United Nations are only those required to make peace enforceable and disarmament effective.

Even with these new powers, the strengthened United Nation or world security authority could only prevent, not govern. Except for preventing war, it would have no power

to deal with any of the scores of hundreds of matters with which national, state, provincial, cantonal or local governments concern themselves. It would have competence in only one field of law: that set up to prevent the settlement of international controversies by violence. If in some cities there were an authority whose police, detective or "inspection" force, executive head, courts, legislative body, and power to raise revenue were strictly limited to a single law against certain crimes of violence, such as murder, assault and battery, rioting, and so forth, and had no authority or competence in any other field, it could hardly be called a government. Nor could the strengthened United Nations be considered a government of the world or "world government." A "government" which had no power to invade the sovereignty of the nations nor to touch the lives of their citizens (unless it or they violated the world law against war and aggression) would not be much of a government!

Moreover, another Great War would gravely threaten the sovereign independence, freedom, welfare and safety of many nations, including those now neutral and uncommitted. An assured peace under world law would eliminate this threat.

Furthermore, the present danger of war forces the nations reluctantly to take many unhappy steps, such for example as imposing heavy taxes for non-productive armaments or submitting to regimentations and losses of liberty, which they would not take if they were free to choose. Thus their exercise of their sovereign rights—their control over their own sovereign concerns—is today gravely impaired. But with assurance against war and aggression, this sovereign control would be restored.

There is a parallel. Sovereignty for a nation is much the same as freedom for an individual. Some 40 years ago the police in Boston, Massachusetts, went on strike. For three days there was no such thing as law and order. The citizens suddenly had complete, unlimited freedom. It was like a frontier community in the early days of the Western United States. Citizens were free to shoot, to rob, to kill, unrestrained by any enforceable law; to band together for their mutual protection. But they quickly learned that freedom unlimited is not freedom but

anarchy; that unless the people give up just enough of their freedom to permit the imposition upon them of law and order, they cannot enjoy the reality of freedom at all.

Just so, among the nations of today, any nation willing to break its promises can attack its neighbor unrestrained except by fear of strong resistance or retaliation. The citizens of Boston only regained their lost freedom when the police went back on duty and law and order were restored. Similarly, the nations of the world will only regain their lost sovereign control when law and order are established among them.

Peace under world law does not undertake to make quarrels and controversies between nations impossible; only to prevent their settlement by violent means, that is, by war. The purpose of police, courts, and the like, in local communities is not to prevent controversies from arising, but to prevent their settlement by violence when they do arise. These institutions provide peaceable means for settling controversies when they occur and compel the use of those means: the same thing would be true of a strengthened United Nations or world security authority.

No Frozen Status Quo

The plan would not freeze into permanence present situations regarded by substantial groups of people in certain areas as injustices. Nor would it make it more difficult for peoples to emerge into nationhood. If it did, it would be unacceptable to many nations now members of the United Nations as well as to certain other territories. On the contrary, all the strategic considerations which make certain stronger nations now desire to retain control over their dependent territories would disappear with assurance against war. Moreover, attempts to gain freedom or independence within any nation or to change its government from within could not be forbidden, in the writer's opinion, although certain situations could be prevented from erupting into international war. If such situations gave rise to political disputes between nations, they would fall within the jurisdiction of the special "equity tribunals," or would be taken care of by the world legislative body or parliament.

World-wide educational and informational publicity, sustained over a number of

years, planned and tailored to the culture and the media of each area of the world, should make practically every man and woman on earth aware of the great and heartwarming benefits, of the hopes for goals eagerly desired, which would be held out to them and their children if the nations and their governments were persuaded to accept the two inescapably interdependent objectives of disarmament under world law plus a world mutual development fund. This publicity could create a powerful and constantly growing demand for the acceptance of the twin objectives from which alone such benefits could flow. That demand might well become so strong that any government would hesitate to reject the plan and thus risk the resentment of the peoples of the world and particularly of those of the underdeveloped and underprivileged areas. This would be the more true, since both great adversaries are seeking earnestly to appeal for the friendship and support of many of these same underprivileged nations which would gain most if the proposal were accepted.

The Cost of Disarmament

The cost of carrying out these twin objectives of disarmament, plus the Fund for Investment in underdeveloped areas to help them raise gradually their standard of living, has been estimated at about one-third of the world's total war budgets of somewhere between \$110 and \$140 billion a year. The other two-thirds of the war budgets eliminated by effective disarmament could be left in the hands of the taxpayers of each country, or used for such purposes as highways, schools, teachers' salaries, hospitals, medical research and private and public enterprises of all kinds. The use of these funds would be decided in the democratic countries by the people through their representatives; in Russia and certain other countries by their governments; in a number of countries by a ruling group or clique. But regardless of what individuals, or how few or how many have the power to decide in any country how the two-thirds of its eliminated war budget should be used—or misused—the fact that this money would remain at their disposal would of course be an additional inducement to accept the plan.

A Simple Blueprint

The plan in its simplest terms involves three elements:

1. A campaign of world-wide, long-sustained educational publicity to inform men and women everywhere of the benefits of:

2. World law, with total disarmament, under a strengthened United Nations, combined with,

3. A world Mutual Development Fund financed not out of additional taxes but out of the savings from effective disarmament, to help raise the standard of living of all mankind and in particular of the underprivileged areas of the world.

If this plan were put forward by either of the great adversary power groups its acceptance would be rendered impossible or at best interminably delayed by the deadly mutual distrust between them and their fear of losing face."

But there is a better alternative. If such a plan were offered to the two adversaries by a concert of all or most of the neutral and uncommitted nations of the world it would of course avoid this distrust and could be accepted without loss of "face" by either. Moreover, coming as it would from the very group of nations, to which each of the adversaries seeks earnestly to appeal for friendship and influence, it could not be lightly ignored. Still further, it would promise great benefits to all peoples and especially to the vast populations of the underprivileged areas. It would promise peace, protection of sovereign independence, and a better life. Thus it would be difficult for either adversary to reject it, or for any long period of time to obstruct it.

There is little doubt that the United States and its allies would accept; Secretary Herter's speech of February 18, 1960, took a number of steps on the road to such a proposal. As to Russia, this writer believes that in all probability the Kremlin would accept the plan provided the proposal came from uncommitted nations. Certainly this would make it far easier to accept. There are many reasons for this, all of which fully recognize the deep distrust of each adversary for the other. Without exception, every one of the many scores of eminent and informed men from Europe, Africa, Asia and the two

Americas to whom the writer has talked about this—including heads of state, past and present prime ministers, foreign ministers, and others in and out of high public office—agree that the Kremlin does not desire or plan for a great war.

Indeed, in an all-out war between Russia and the United States and its allies, only China would profit. China would be left free to overrun Asia. Such a war would gravely hinder Russia's campaign to gain influence in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, and, in setting back and seriously damaging her industrial development, would likewise weaken Russia and interfere with that campaign. Even though she won it in the end, a damaged Russia might well emerge from such a war as second to China in power and influence in the Communist world. The day which Russia undoubtedly fears and is planning for—the day when China attains economic, financial, and military independence of Russia and no longer needs Russian assistance—would be brought nearer and Russia would be weakened to meet that day. Russia absolutely *must* strengthen herself as rapidly as possible both internally, and by gaining influence in countries now uncommitted, before that day comes. This writer believes it probable that the Kremlin needs and desires a dependable peace as much as any other government.

Moreover, informed men believe that the Kremlin leaders have complete confidence in the Marxist doctrine of the ultimately certain victory of communism in the world. They are confident that they can win the world without a great war. They cannot afford a great war, for reasons some of which are given above. They are doubtless sure that with their heavy war budget eliminated and two-thirds of it remaining at their disposal they could strengthen their own position with their people by raising living standards and speeding up their industrial development. In propaganda for domestic consumption they could undoubtedly try to take credit for having saved the Russian people from another and much dreaded great war. It is very probable, the writer is inclined to believe, that these Kremlin leaders would consider that the advantages of accepting such a proposal, once widely publicized

(Continued on page 100)

This long-time student of world federalism argues that any international government, to be effective, must be organized on the federal, not the League, principle if absolute national sovereignties are to yield some of their powers to a supra-national government.

The League of Nations: Another "Rope of Sand"

By VERNON NASH

Field Representative, U. S. Committee for a World Constitutional Convention

ALL the dominant figures in the creation and functioning of the League of Nations are gone. But other men and women who are still fully active served in their earlier years on the secretariat and staff in Geneva or in delegations of their nations at League meetings.

Many present senior citizens in their youth debated the proposal for a "League to Enforce Peace" as vigorously as students this year are tackling the still pre-eminent question of how to make the world safe for democracy. The precocious Walter Lippmann while still in his twenties served under Woodrow Wilson in a preparatory group on plans for peace, and then served as an assistant to persons near the center of power through most of the Versailles Conference which established the League of Nations.

Reviewing the period between the two world wars is not, therefore, a study of ancient history. When our most elderly living citizens were born, some persons were still

alive who had been born before Washington's inauguration. All of us who are 57 years old and over have life-spans more than a third that of the United States since it became a federal union.

The writer returned to Oxford after military service to live in that citadel of "bull sessions" and of formal debates in the world-famous Oxford Union while the League was being created on the other side of the English Channel. Since I am in the age group who saw later the deadly disillusionment produced by the League's repetition of the sad history of all previous confederations, I have never ceased to be grateful to a fellow Rhodes Scholar who was thought at the time to be woefully cynical. Through all our wranglings, he reiterated this advice: "Read the *Federalist Papers*, XV to XXII, especially No. 15." Thanks to that advice and to Alexander Hamilton, I never expected anything better in the League's performance than that which came to pass. Nor was I ever able later to take seriously the extravagant hopes for the United Nations, so widely expressed at its founding.

Another Oxford contemporary was Clarence K. Streit. He became a foreign correspondent of *The New York Times*, and for more than a decade was accredited to the League by that outstanding newspaper. Out of that experience came one of the epochal books of our time, "Union Now." Most organized efforts for supra-national government date from its publication in 1939.

"League or Union: Three Tests" is the

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theme of Chapter VII of "Union Now." Lord Lothian, then British Ambassador to the United States, said of this section that it was not argument but demonstration by reason of its documentation from the League of Nations record. Though I am personally convinced, as always, that an exclusive start toward world government by any group on the basis of its own terms would be a grave mistake, Streit's chapter otherwise deserves to stand beside the compelling fact and logic presented by Hamilton, Madison and Jay in the debates of 1788.

The chief reason usually given for the League's failure was the absence from its membership of so powerful a nation as the United States. If this argument is valid, how shall we explain the case histories of many other confederations with complete memberships? The similarity of their records to that of the League of Nations is pronounced.

International Specialized Agencies

In assaying the benefits of any loose association of fully sovereign states, it is necessary to distinguish sharply between activities best carried on by means of voluntary cooperation and those which at all other levels of life have always required coercion. In the latter category, leagues have uniformly been futile; otherwise they have been very useful. We are enormously indebted to the League of Nations for its varied work in the so-called "specialized agencies." Pioneering efforts in the international control of the trade in narcotics, in the handling of epidemic diseases, and in the suppression of the "white slave" traffic were perhaps most notable instances of the League's service to mankind. Its repatriation and rehabilitation of displaced persons set a magnificent precedent which unhappily was not followed to any corresponding degree after 1945.

Still, some of the more important world organizations, then as now, were autonomous bodies, such as the International Labor Organization (I.L.O.). Any rightful estimate of the League's worth, moreover, must weigh the good it did against its inability to prevent World War II. Nothing else matters much any more if we cannot take the war system out of human life. And this the League could not do.

Summaries of the League's history and authoritative comment are to be found in articles in any standard encyclopedia. The section on the League's origin and an analysis of the Covenant in the *Britannica* of 1948 were written by Lord Robert (Viscount) Cecil, a member of the small commission which formulated the first draft of the Covenant for submission to the Versailles Conference.

The work of the League's first eight years is then outlined and discussed by Sir James Arthur Salter, formerly professor of political theory at Oxford, who was director of the economic and finance section of the League from its founding to 1931. The rest of the organization's active functioning is set forth by an American, Dr. Raymond B. Fosdick, first Under-Secretary-General of the League and thereafter for a long period president of the Rockefeller Foundation.

Fatuous contradictions stand out in these three accounts; partially for this reason, doubtless, an entirely new article on the League of Nations was used in subsequent printings. The article in the 1959 edition of the *Britannica* was written by Francis Paul Walters, an Oxford Fellow and for a time Deputy Secretary-General of the League. His account, on the whole, is well balanced, coherent and consistent as the previous article was not.

Even a cursory examination of materials about any confederation will reveal how heavy is the emphasis in the beginning on confident expectation that the organization would be able to keep the peace. It was the explicitly expressed opinion of Professor Walters that Articles 10-17 contained "the basic idea of the League: Collective Security."

Soon after a league begins to function emphasis shifts to a featuring of its achievements in non-military areas. Apologetic explanations for its failure to prevent wars stress the plea that it would have succeeded in its primary function if its members had been willing to support it. This affirmation simply begs the central question.

What slightest justification was there ever for expecting satisfactory behavior by fully independent units? Have any other words of Alexander Hamilton been more widely quoted, and more universally ignored, than

these: To expect harmonious action among absolute sovereignties with acute conflicts of interest is to disregard "the accumulated experience of all the ages"?

Weakness of Confederations

Nevertheless, Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, a British Foreign Minister and a winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1937, could say in his *Britannica* piece: "... no civilized state would, in 1914, have ventured to declare war had it been threatened by such a universal boycott as is stipulated by Article 16. . . ." A few pages later Dr. Fosdick elaborates in a ghastly presaging of World War II the various futile attempts in the League to get its members to apply military and economic sanctions.

It has often been suggested that uncertainty as to what the United States would do stayed the hands of Britain and France when Mussolini started his rape of Ethiopia in 1935. We promptly imposed an embargo on both belligerents, but the major fear of European powers was that Italy would make war on them if seriously threatened by sanctions. They demanded assurance that we would come to their aid, and this the United States would not give.

Those who indignantly condemned our refusal usually overlooked the fact that the roles had been reversed only four years before in the Manchurian crisis. Nations will act vigorously in an international organization only if their own self-interest is so gravely and directly affected that they do so anyway. Here, surely, is the gravamen in all indictments of all confederations. Listen to Hamilton (*Federalist Paper* XV): "Compacts . . . exist . . . subject to the usual vicissitudes . . . of observance or non-observance, as the interests or passions of the contracting powers dictate." "If, therefore, the measures of the Confederacy cannot be executed without the intervention of the particular administrations, there will be little prospect of their being executed at all. The rulers of the respective members . . . will undertake to judge of the propriety of the measures themselves. . . ." "... The experiment we have made . . . is equally attested by the events which have befallen all other governments of the confederate kind of which we have any account. . . : [It is] the parent of anarchy."

Absolute national sovereignty is the road-block always; its supremacy was stressed even more in the League than it has been in the United Nations. We now are confronted with the viciousness of the veto on the part of only five members; the Covenant (Art. 5, Sect. 1) required unanimous agreement by all members in all matters of substance, i.e., everything except purely procedural questions. Such unity is not obtainable often, even in a Quaker meeting.

The Question of Sovereignty

This handicap was magnified by another recognition of sovereignty common to almost all leagues; every member had one vote without respect to size, power or stake in the maintenance of order. Nations in any matter of vital consequence to themselves will not submit their case to such a tribunal. Hence the League was by-passed as consistently as the United Nations has been, and for similar reasons.

A concise yet comprehensive description of leagues is found in this precise paragraph by Sir Arthur Salter: "The League is not a super-state with either the right or the authority to impose its will on the sovereign States which compose it. It is essentially an organ for securing agreement between them, and its power of action is at any time limited by the extent of possible agreement."

Hans J. Morgenthau, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, wrote in his article on "Peace" in the 1959 *Britannica* (section on "International Government," i. e., the League, the United Nations, and other confederations): "The attempts to secure peace by an international government of sovereign nations have all been victims of a contradiction inherent in these very attempts. . . . a contradiction which can be eliminated only by a direct attack upon national sovereignty itself."

Many authorities hold that the sovereignty of the member-nations in the League was infringed in an important respect by Section 6 of Article 16 of the Covenant. In this the members pledged themselves not to go to war to enforce a claim rejected by all the members of the Security Council other than the disputants. This contention would be valid only if such undertakings proved to be dependable, but they did not.

Most experts in this field hold that a nation limits its sovereignty every time it ratifies a treaty commitment of any kind. But no nation's record is any too good in the matter of strict adherence to its treaty obligations. The fact would seem to be that a state has not given up its "final say-so" in any area of life so long as it retains the *power* to do as it pleases. Herein lies the fundamental difficulty in securing any thorough-going disarmament.

The accepted substitute for the League of Nations in most by-passings of it came to be known as "Diplomacy by Conference." It is a very popular aphorism to observe that so long as nations go on talking they aren't fighting. It can just as precisely be said that the nations talked themselves right into World War II—in the League, in meetings of the Supreme Allied Council, and especially in the frequent "Ambassadors' Conferences," a continuous round of futility.

Talking usually exacerbates rather than soothes when all are aware that no definitive end can be reached by their exchanges. We repeat such folly with this difference: Where world conferences used to be composed of accredited diplomats, all featured international meetings now are attended by foreign ministers, and there is an ever mounting insistence for regular gatherings by the heads of states, the so-called "Summit Conferences." The United Nations was created, supposedly, to do just what these conferences seek to accomplish.

The League of Nations is now credited with whatever benefits "Diplomacy by Conference" achieved by an alleged relieving of tensions. Yet call the roll of these meetings—San Remo, Spa, Paris, London, Cannes, Genoa, Lausanne, Locarno. In not one of these did the League have any direct part, but few meetings of the Assembly or Council were so important or so featured as were these gatherings outside Geneva's functioning.

Corfu: Success or Failure

Note, particularly, what is usually cited as one of the League's most striking successes. When Italian naval forces occupied Corfu in 1923, Greece appealed to the League Council. The incident was promptly referred to an Ambassadors' Conference for

mediation. Italy was persuaded to withdraw under secret conditions; she got in full the exorbitant reparations demanded from Greece though there was a near-consensus in the world that Italy had been the aggressor. The League has been warmly applauded for a series of excellent proposals it then made for avoiding a repetition of such incidents; this acclaim is rarely accompanied by the nullifying footnote that the League never secured the adoption of a single one of these proposals.

Compare Corfu with the most publicized "success" of the United Nations, the ending of the first Israeli-Arab War. An uneasy peace in Palestine was secured by permitting Israel to keep all she had gained by force of arms. Among these spoils were valuable areas which had been awarded to Arab states in the partition findings of an earlier United Nations commission. Scarcely a way to discourage war-makers! But the mediator, Dr. Ralph Bunche, got a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts!

The common understanding now is that the League was killed by the outbreak of World War II; actually it was moribund from 1936 on when Hitler's successful defiance of it in the Rhineland was added to the earlier floutings by Japan and Italy. Its formal end did not come until April 19, 1946, when all powers and functions entrusted to it in treaties were transferred to the United Nations, as were all its material possessions. The League had ceased to exist before the 1948 edition of the *Britannica* reached the public. Hence the closing words of its League article have a tragic irony: "Now in Geneva splendid new buildings to house the League are nearing completion, an appropriate symbol of its permanent character." These facilities are now the European headquarters of the United Nations.

Then, as now, there was much talk of the need to "strengthen" the League. This cannot be done meaningfully; confederations can only be transformed. The contention, then as now, that strong popular support could make a decisive difference runs quickly into an impasse. General attention tends to center upon the war issue; just as soon as it becomes apparent that a body is impotent in this respect, the prevalent attitude toward it becomes one of contemptuous indifference.

The League had many successes in handling tense situations of a relatively minor nature. Most of these were of a type which heretofore had yielded to the "good-office" mediation of friendly powers, and were in no way therefore a distinctive value of the League. The dreariest element in the whole unhappy story was the almost continuous effort to secure some measure of disarmament in the midst of anarchy. Our record in recent years seems altogether too much like the re-run of an old film.

The final words of Professor Walters' article in the 1959 *Britannica* are that the United Nations Charter was supposed to have corrected imperfections in the Covenant but "in its purposes and principles, its institutions and its methods, the new organization followed in nearly every point the precedents of the old."

The crux of our whole issue can perhaps be stated in this question: Why do nations, as a rule, refuse to honor their solemn commitments to join in disciplining a peace-breaker? The only method available through leagues is essentially that of vigilante bands in frontier communities. This simply cannot be made to work at the international level. Why? Because, as Walter Lippmann has repeatedly suggested, the remedy is as bad as the disease.

The Fundamental Obstacle

One should scrutinize most carefully any analogies between the evolution from lawlessness into law by societies of individuals and similar efforts by independent political units. When cowboys met at a rendezvous to go after a bunch of outlaws, they did so knowing that the cattle rustlers would be heavily outnumbered and would possess light arms only. Nations which are asked to act in concert against an aggressor, as in Korea, must be willing to throw millions of men armed with weapons of incredible destruction against other millions similarly armed. This is such a difference in degree as to be a difference in kind.

It remains one of the abiding mysteries of all time why a person with a world-wide reputation in both the fields of history and of government, like Woodrow Wilson, should ever have thought that the League could do what he expected of it. In his great text-

book, "The State," Wilson had quoted with approval the assertion of George Washington that our Articles of Confederation were "a rope of sand which could bind no one." Why, then, should the "Father of the League of Nations" have thought that the Covenant was a steel hawser? Hindsight now answers that he expected it to develop into what was needed, but his declarations to the Senate and the country during the fight over ratification abound in confident affirmations that the League of Nations was adequate "as it stood."

To answer fully an oft-asked question why federal systems of government have normally succeeded where leagues have failed does not fall within the purview of the present writer's assigned task. It was Hamilton's judgment that leagues fail primarily because they attempt the impossible, a government over governments. The one legitimate object of government, he suggests, is an individual person. All law in a disarmed society must be applicable to, and enforced upon, individuals.

The use of military means *within* a governed regime, says Hamilton, is permissible only in meeting armed mass opposition to its authority in riots or rebellion. An international *police* force must be a constabulary, not a militia. World law must be enforced in our neighborhood planet as all law elsewhere is upheld. In federal systems each government must have such authority and power only in the areas of jurisdiction assigned to it.

Item number one on humanity's agenda does not require the abolition of national sovereignty; we need only end its absolute nature. Is sovereignty thus divisible? Many authorities in political science think not. Even if one accepts this dictum as correct, such indivisible sovereignty can be vested where it should be—in the consent of the governed—and then allocated by a sovereign people in appropriate parts to various levels of government. Existing federal unions have successfully done this as between state or provincial governments on the one hand and national governments on the other. A third level can be established; we can and must put the vital common concerns of the human race under the unchallengeable control of a Commonwealth of Man.

"Will regional organizations, often rivals and mutually exclusive, hinder rather than help the cause of world federation which seems the only possible though as yet hardly practical solution to the evils of international life?" Raising the question, this author evaluates the various forms of regional organization and concludes that "to dismiss regionalism in favor of an abstract idea of a world government would be to ignore realities and engage in search of perfect solutions in an imperfect world."

Regionalism and World Federalism

By PIOTR S. WANDYCZ

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EXPERIENCES of the Second World War and its aftermath made it painfully clear to statesmen and ordinary citizens alike that international relations must have a radical transformation if humanity is to escape repetition of the 1939–1945 catastrophe on a much bigger scale. The system of fully sovereign nation states, surely anachronistic today, calls for a thorough revision, to put an end to what intelligent observers have long described as the international anarchy of interstate relations.

In the course of the Second World War there appeared various proposals for radical changes in international society. In a broadcast over the BBC on March 21, 1943, Churchill outlined his plans for a World Council based on regional councils for Europe, America and the Pacific, and suggested a Europe composed of states and regional confederations. The Polish and Czechoslovak governments in exile in London pro-

ceeded to plan a regional union between their countries after the war; the Yugoslavs and Greeks followed suit. The idea of the regional grouping later known as Benelux—Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—first appeared during the war years. And on the eve of the world conflict Clarence K. Streit, the well-known *New York Times* correspondent in Geneva, came out with his book, *Union Now*, in which he advocated a federation of the United States, Britain and Western European countries. The movement "Federal Union," which espoused this idea, obtained in an unofficial referendum of August, 1942, the support of ten million Americans.

The federalist trend was, of course, an old phenomenon in Europe. In the prewar period, French Prime Minister Aristide Briand had advocated a European Union, and as early as 1923 Count Coudenhove-Kalergi was propagating the idea of a "*PanEuropa*."

What was new during the era of the Second World War was the enlarged scope of federalist proposals. Europe having dwindled in importance, the protagonists of an international federal approach cast their eyes on the world as a whole. Yet the people of the world, and especially those statesmen in power, were not ready to follow such drastic recommendations.

The only global organization that emerged after the war was the United Nations, with its numerous agencies. It was hardly a departure from the time-honored type of organization based on the recognition of sovereign equality of member states. If the U.N.

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Charter differed from the Covenant of the League of Nations, the difference did not consist of the new body's adopting a world federalist approach. If anything, the emphasis was on predominance of the great powers, which corresponds to the prevailing conditions of the post-war world. The United Nations, an inter-governmental institution, proved a useful and necessary organization, but it was not a step forward toward the big goal—a world government.

The proponents of federalist solutions were naturally dissatisfied with the United Nations, and they strove and agitated for something more. Popular organizations with a federalist platform mushroomed, especially in Europe. There arose the *Union Européenne des Fédéralistes* in 1946; the "United Europe" in 1947; the "European Movement" in 1948. Soon lesser groupings joined.

Nor were the world federalists behind the Europeans. In 1946 they organized the World Movement for World Federal Government and showed great activity, especially in their students' section. Another organization known as the World Republic began to act, and a young student, Gary Davis, publicly tore up his American passport in 1948, proclaiming himself the first citizen of the world.

However sincere and enthusiastic the protagonists of a federated world, or of a world government, their activities were completely unrealistic in the context of the international situation of the time. In the late 1940's the cold war was setting in, and the Korean war in 1950 brought a rude awakening to those idealists who assumed that a united world of brotherhood and peace was just around the corner. The activity of the world federalists declined, that of the Europeans continued—but in the political frame of the cold war, the Marshall Plan, and Nato.

In the last decade, the 1950's, plans for world order and world security—as distinct from the dream of a world government—hinged on the relations between the two blocs grouped around America and the Soviet Union. Discussions within the United Nations and at summit meetings produced no real solution, though Soviet policy shifted to new methods represented by the new Russian leader Nikita Khrushchev.

Meanwhile regional organizations of vari-

ous types and character continued their existence and in some cases gained in importance. Some of them had been established for a long time, such as the Organization of American States; others such as NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and several European "communities" came into existence in the first troubled years after the Second World War. Are these regional organizations a step forward in the direction of a world order that might perhaps be realized one day, or are they retarding such an evolution? This is an important and often repeated question, which already had occupied the League of Nations in the 1920's. The issue then appeared in discussions about strengthening the Covenant, and the question then was whether the road to universal security lay through regional organizations. Today the question may be rephrased to read: will regional organizations, often rivals and mutually exclusive, hinder rather than help the cause of world federation which seems the only possible though as yet hardly practical solution to the evils of international life?

To give an opinion on this difficult question one must, of course, examine the main regional organizations which exist today.

Regional Groupings

It is evident that these groupings fall into several distinct categories depending on their principal function, aims and methods of organization. There are, first of all, blocs which are clearly a product of the cold war and which are set up with military purposes in mind. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Warsaw Pact, the South East Asia Treaty Organization, and others clearly belong to this category. In the second place one finds regional organizations of a continental type such as the Organization of American States, and the European communities, *viz.* the Coal and Steel Community, the European Common Market, the Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), the Council of Europe, the Western European Union, and others. Thirdly, there exist regional groupings of a subcontinental type occupying small geographical areas. In this category one finds the Benelux and the Scandinavian Nordic Council group.

A special place is finally occupied by regional organizations which are either of an

almost exclusively economic character, such as the European Payment Union, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (O.E.E.C.), or the Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia, or which are little more than understandings between groups of nations bound by certain interests as is the case of the Asian-African group within the United Nations created at the Bandung Conference in 1955.

The scope of this paper does not permit a thorough examination of all the different regional organizations mentioned above. Still one may attempt to examine a few of the more representative types to see to what extent if any they are likely to help or hinder a future and better world organization.

Nato

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization came officially into existence on April 4, 1949, and its objectives as enumerated in the treaty are "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law"; "to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic areas"; and "to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security." Exigencies of the cold war rather than consideration of geography or traditional affinity determined the membership of the alliance. Thus side by side with the North Atlantic states one finds among the Nato membership countries such as Italy, Greece or even Turkey, which geographically belong to the Mediterranean region and which do not fully share with other members a common political tradition.

Apart from collective security, the Nato states naturally had pursued certain common policies coordinated through the Nato Council (which comprises Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of Defense, and of Finance) and through the International Secretariat. Efforts also have been made to improve co-operation in nonmilitary fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community, but little progress has been achieved. This is perhaps not very startling. As mentioned above, members of Nato belong to different regions, and intimate co-operation could be more fruitful on a more limited geo-

graphical scale. Britain and the three Scandinavian members differ in many ways from the continental European associates; western states differ from Greece and Turkey. It is hardly surprising therefore that six continental nations of Europe should have contracted closer ties among themselves through several European communities.

The six states, sometimes referred to as Little Europe—France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries—have striven for political, economic, and military co-operation based on a new type of relationship. Federalist tendencies and a supranational approach led to formation of the Coal and Steel Community, to unsuccessful attempts to form a European Defense Community (E.D.C.), and have lately resulted in initiation of a Common Market and Euratom. Finally, after the failure of the E.D.C., a Western European Union emerged in 1954 to cope with the problem of German rearmament. One could best describe this last organization as a European subdivision of Nato, with certain characteristics of its own.

European regional organizations represent the most complex and in many ways the most interesting example of a new type of regionalism. They range from the Council of Europe, with a membership comprising most of the non-Communist European states, through the above-named communities, down to small units like the Scandinavian bloc (the Nordic Council) and Benelux. Many of these groupings are not merely traditional alliances or unions but represent attempts to limit national sovereignty and introduce supranational agencies, councils, parliamentary assemblies, and similar bodies. This is particularly true for Little Europe. Britain and the Scandinavian countries on the whole favor informal ties, and prefer a pragmatic approach to co-operation, in the belief that practical experiences and genuinely common interests matter more than constitutional arrangements. Several European states belong simultaneously to different organizations in Europe. Lack of uniformity is perhaps one of the most striking features of European integration, and one can search in vain for a clear organizational pattern.

The O.A.S.

In contrast to European regionalism, the

Organization of American States (O.A.S.) offers an example of a different type of co-operation. Preceding European pacts by nearly half a century—the first Pan-American Conference met in 1889—regionalism in the Western hemisphere derived much of its inspiration from the Monroe Doctrine forbidding European intervention in America. The United States from the beginning had assumed initiative and leadership, a fact which has both serious advantages and disadvantages. The O.A.S. (until 1951 it went by the name of the Union of American Republics) is neither a purely defensive, nor political, nor economic arrangement, but a combination of the three.

For purely defensive purposes there is the Rio Defense Treaty of 1947, providing for collective security under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Economic co-operation, however, never approached anything resembling a customs union, although American economic might weighs heavily over the Latin American states. Political co-operation manifested in periodic Pan-American meetings rests largely upon the overwhelming power of the United States. There is still, of course, insistence by the South American states on the principle of complete nonintervention, and one hears accusations that Washington exercises undue influence in some of the more turbulent Caribbean and Central American republics. It seems unlikely that under existing conditions regional co-operation in the Western hemisphere can make much progress or develop new forms of a federalist or supranational character.

Regional organizations in the West, whether of a primarily defensive type like Nato, or more closely-knit and showing some federalist features like the European communities, comprise states which differ considerably from each other in their political and economic forms, and which furthermore cling jealously to their independence. Nations which form part of the Soviet bloc exhibit far greater cohesion based on a common Communist outlook; such a regional organization as the Warsaw Pact has greater uniformity than anything comparable in the West.

The Warsaw Pact

The Warsaw Pact came into existence in

May, 1955, when Soviet Russia and her European "satellites" signed a Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Aid. The treaty, ostensibly a Soviet reply to Nato, brought little change to the existing pattern of relations. A network of bilateral treaties and alliances had already linked all of the members of the Warsaw Pact with each other and the Soviet Union, and the new agreement was merely the first multilateral convention establishing a unified command and a central council similar to the chief organ of Nato. Paradoxically enough, the Russian commentators on the Pact emphasized that the new organization, unlike Nato, based itself "on the doctrine of mutual respect and nonintervention in each other's internal affairs." Thus while in the West talk about federalism went hand in hand with jealous preservation of actual independence, in the East assertions about full and undiminished sovereignty accompanied actual undisputed control of the Soviet Union over its junior partners.

The Warsaw Pact, using the term in the broadest meaning, is a regional arrangement—it expressly refers to the U.N. Charter—which greatly differs from and yet resembles in a specific way both Nato and the O.A.S. The difference is obvious. Ideological ties of the governing groups assure the unity of the Soviet bloc. The Warsaw Pact has no roots in a freely expressed consent of the Poles, Hungarians, Czechoslovaks or other nationalities. The similarity of the Pact to Nato and O.A.S. is less obvious, but one can find it by comparing the respective positions of the United States and Russia in the world of today. Both nations are superpowers which clearly command a dominant position with regard to their associates. Nato is largely an American-inspired and American-led organization, though common fear of the Soviet danger assures its cohesion. The Warsaw Pact naturally is under direction of the Kremlin. American might and geographic proximity explain some of the character of the O.A.S.; the Soviet shadow over East Central Europe accounts for the ties of this region with Moscow.

In the past the rulers of the Kremlin viewed with suspicion any attempt at more intimate co-operation among the East Central European states. They prevented devel-

opments comparable to those which have taken place within Nato. Whether the Kremlin will continue to pursue this policy or allow a greater freedom of maneuver to the European satellites remains to be seen. Economic dependence of the East Central European region on Russia makes it doubtful, although slow changes within the Soviet bloc leave some ray of hope.

Regional Groupings and the U.N.

Most regional organizations existing today find their legal justification in Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter which allows for regional ties among member states. Yet the principal objective of such blocs as Nato and the Warsaw Pact is not to deal with local problems within the U.N. but to achieve the security which they cannot enjoy through the United Nations, torn as it is between two rival blocs. In this sense Nato and the Warsaw Pact are the result of the general insecurity which pervades international relations today. It seems clear that so long as the world consists of two blocs no world government can emerge. Regional groupings which are not an end in themselves but ought to be part of a larger whole must remain within one bloc or the other.

It is true that one avenue of international co-operation remains which cuts across the bloc divisions and which some people consider as the only hope for achieving a united world. This is the so-called functional approach. Supporters of this approach to international affairs argue that the existing interdependence of the world can in time obliterate political divisions and undermine the sovereignty of individual states. Functional ties of a nonpolitical character may bind states more closely together and overcome mutual antagonisms. Supporters of this idea point to the success of such institutions as the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), to mention only a few. Their success is undeniable, but a belief that nonpolitical co-operation can resolve political problems appears as much of a dream as the old Marxist belief that in a Communist state the administration

of things can replace the government of men.

There is no doubt that functional ties will multiply in a world that becomes constantly more interdependent. It seems also natural that regional arrangements of a political, military or economic nature will continue to grow in so far as they correspond to the diversity of mankind and local needs. Should the present division of the world come miraculously to an end, many of the existing regional organizations would probably disappear or change radically. This would apply particularly to blocs of a military type. But unless the world came under domination of one superpower which could impose its will on other nations and create a twentieth-century version of a Pax Romana, there is no reason to suppose that all regional organizations will disappear.

Prospects for Regionalism

The question of whether regionalism leads to a world order or hinders its emergence is largely academic. One might argue from a doctrinaire position that regional interests will always conflict with larger schemes; one could also argue that unless regionalism triumphs and larger units superimpose themselves on states it is impossible to visualize a world government composed of totally unequal partners. Such discussion is in many ways fruitless. No doctrinaire solution, however perfect it may appear on paper, is likely to work unless it corresponds to the real forces in society. The complexity of international relations, the growth of regional groupings, local interests, and functional ties, would render any simple solution utterly unrealistic.

Regionalism, one may conclude, in some instances will hinder and in others help an evolution toward a new world order, depending on the type of regionalism and on the stage of development of international society. Certain forms of it involve themselves today with the conflict between two blocs; others represent a genuine and positive search for units larger than nation states; others reflect the traditional forms of local co-operation. To dismiss regionalism in favor of an abstract idea of a world government would be to ignore realities and engage in search of perfect solutions in an imperfect world.

Can the nations of the world form a federal union? Pointing out that the American "experiment in federalism, probably the most impressive in all history, was conducted in a favorable environment," this author warns that "even crises will scarcely offset the diversity of cultural backgrounds and the pervasive influence of existing nationalisms" in a projected world-wide federal union.

The American Adventure in Federalism

By HAROLD W. BRADLEY

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THE THIRTEEN American colonies which revolted against Great Britain in 1775–1776 did so as individual colonies. When they renounced British sovereignty, they did not immediately create one new nation but rather 13 independent states as successors to the former colonies. It is true that when fighting began, representatives of the new states met in a Continental Congress to co-ordinate their activities in the common struggle against Great Britain. The very existence of the Congress implied a community of interests among the states. This Congress was, therefore, at once the representative of a coalition and the germ of a future nation.

The ambiguous position of the states in relation to the group was evident in the phrasing of some key sentences of the Declaration of Independence. The signers described themselves as "the representatives of the united States of America," and later in the same paragraph they declared that the former colonies had become "Free and Independent States" with full power to perform

all acts "which Independent States may of right do." Congress still spoke for a coalition, but the use of the term "united" implied that the 13 states were committed to some permanent type of federation.

The advantages of a continuing federation were so obvious that there appears to have been no serious objection to the idea. The states were, however, jealous of their sovereignty, and many of their leaders feared that a strong central government would prove as arbitrary and indifferent to local interests as had been Great Britain. They were willing to grant to the government of the federation only those powers which were required for the prosecution of the war and for the conduct of foreign relations and the mutual defense after the close of the war. These basic fears of strong government, together with a desire to emphasize the importance of the states, were reflected in the Articles of Confederation, the first constitution of the United States.

The first three articles of the new constitution defined the character of the new government. It was described as a "confederacy" by which the several states entered into "a firm league of friendship with each other, for their common defence" but in which each state retained "its sovereignty, freedom, and independence" except as it expressly delegated certain powers to the central authority. The limited powers granted the confederacy were vested in a legislative body, in which voting was by states and which could adopt

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no measure relating to treaties, finance, or defense unless nine of the thirteen states concurred. No provision was made for an executive branch, and administrative responsibility was left to committees appointed by Congress. There were no federal courts. The states shared with Congress control over such important items as commerce and the currency, and Congress was dependent upon cooperation by the states for the enforcement of its policies, including the collection of taxes and the raising of an army. The Articles of Confederation had done little more than give formal sanction to a league of independent states.

This first American experiment in federalism was scarcely in operation before the victory at Yorktown effectively decided the outcome of the war. With the fear of a crushing defeat removed, there was an inevitable tendency to subordinate national issues and for political leaders to become again immersed in local problems. The nation was also suffering from a commercial and financial depression which perhaps would have undermined popular confidence in any government then in power. The record of the federal government, moreover, was not one to inspire confidence. It had few constructive achievements to its credit; it had failed to gain advantages abroad for American commerce; it had failed to appreciate the gravity of the political chaos west of the Appalachians; and it failed to win the genuine cooperation of the states.

There were signs of improvement in the economy after 1785, but the central government had so far lost the confidence of conservatives that despite hints of returning prosperity the political situation deteriorated rapidly. By 1786, the debility of Congress and pressures within some of the states for the legalization of paper currency had created an atmosphere of crisis. A convention was called to meet at Philadelphia in May, 1787, to amend the Articles in such a manner as to strengthen the authority of the central government.

A New Constitution

This sense of impending crisis was shared by many of the delegates who gathered at Philadelphia. With few exceptions, they accepted the view that the central government

must be given new powers, and they quickly agreed that this could be done only by writing a new constitution which would establish an entirely new government.

The most significant feature of the new constitution was the granting to the central government of power to enforce its own laws, including the collection of taxes, within the states. The federal government was endowed with an effective executive branch, its own system of courts, and authority over foreign and international commerce, the currency, foreign relations and defense. Inasmuch as the states were denied the power to levy duties on imports or to regulate interstate commerce, this new Constitution created a great area of free trade within the United States—a feature which established the basis for the economic interdependency of the various regions and has been commonly regarded as one of the principal factors promoting the success of this experiment in federalism.

The powers granted the federal government by the Constitution appeared to be the minimum required for the success of the experiment. This view was challenged, however, during the debates over ratification of the Constitution by prominent persons who argued that a powerful central government was both unnecessary and dangerous and that it would ultimately eclipse the states in importance. The immediate issue of 1787–1789 was resolved in favor of the proponents of strong government, but the problem of the proper division of authority between the federal government and the states has reappeared periodically as a basic issue in national politics.

In constitutional terms, the issue has turned upon definitions of the character of the power granted the federal government and of the scope of the powers reserved to the states. Politically, the issue has commonly been described in the same terms; and opponents of an expanded federal authority usually describe their position as a defense of “states’ rights.” In matters of law, this is the only form in which the question may be raised.

Political developments, however, have given an air of unreality to the reiteration by politicians of the ancient dogma of “states’ rights.” The shrewd expansion of federal

authority by the Federalists during the administration of George Washington and, later, by the Supreme Court in the era of John Marshall (1801–1835) firmly established the power of the central government against successful assault by a single state. The example of Georgia's defiance of the Supreme Court in the 1830's is sometimes cited, but Georgia could ignore the Court because it had the tacit sympathy of President Andrew Jackson.

The classic test of the power of a single state in conflict with the federal government was the attempt of South Carolina to nullify the tariff act of 1832. The question was settled by a compromise which salvaged the dignity of the state, but the vigor with which Jackson moved to enforce the federal authority and the failure of South Carolina's sister states to give her more than token support was convincing evidence that no state standing alone could challenge the federal government when the President was determined to maintain its authority.

In the practical politics of the conflict between national authority and local interests, the region replaced the individual state as the effective unit in resisting unpopular federal policies. This had been evident as early as the administration of Thomas Jefferson when the New England states acting together, though informally, compelled Jefferson to acquiesce in the repeal of the Embargo Act of 1807. The fact that power rested in the region rather than the individual states was indicated again by the experience of South Carolina, 1832–1833; and after 1830 issues arising from expansion, the tariff, and slavery increasingly emphasized the role of the region as a potent political unit. If the authority of the federal government could be undermined, the challenge clearly must come from a region acting as a unit and not from a single state.

Twice during the first 60 years of the nineteenth century, the people of a region were persuaded that they had become a helpless minority subject to arbitrary rule by the federal government. The first example was New England during the War of 1812, but the protests of New England—which by 1814 appeared to be a prelude to a secessionist movement—were quieted by the general

sense of relief which followed the close of that war. The second example was, of course, the widespread feeling in the South after 1854 that opinion in the northeast and northwest was becoming so hostile as to imperil even the constitutional rights of southerners. The election of Lincoln in 1860 was interpreted as final evidence that on issues which southerners regarded as paramount, their region had become a permanent minority. In this situation they could see but two alternatives: submission or secession. As a proud people inevitably would do, they chose secession. The federal government which, for 70 years, had succeeded in averting disunion through a series of skillfully contrived compromises, appeared to have failed in its greatest test.

Civil War

Critics of federal government in the United States and abroad thought that the outbreak of war in 1861 demonstrated that federalism could not be successful in a large territory with diverse economic and social institutions. The outcome of the war necessarily reversed this judgment. The victory of the union was taken as evidence that the federal government could prevail in open conflict either with a state or a single region. In the tensions which followed the war, proponents of a strong national government acted vigorously to consolidate their triumph by adding to the Constitution two amendments, the fourteenth and fifteenth, which were designed to place further limitations upon the powers of the states.

This sense of triumphant nationalism became a permanent legacy from the era of the Civil War. During the half century from 1880 to 1930, however, it occupied only a subdued role in the actual formulation of public policy. The new authority of the central government and the reduced powers of the states were accepted facts. But only on issues affecting the expansion or regulation of industry or in related economic questions was this shift in the center of power clearly evident. It was the economic depression which began in 1930 which set the stage for a third increment of power in the federal government.

When it became apparent that the states

generally lacked the resources to counteract the downward economic trend, the public looked to the federal government to assume leadership in combating the effects of the depression. This leadership was supplied by President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933–1945). His administrations accepted the duty of the federal government to provide a stable economy and at least a minimum of security for the individual. This so-called “New Deal” was popular in all sections of the nation, was ultimately accepted by the Supreme Court, and was not directly challenged even by political opponents. By 1940, it seemed to have become a permanent part of American political practice.

For the third time in the history of the United States, a grave crisis had led to a significant transfer of power from the individual states to the federal government. These developments came in response to the practical requirements of given situations; they were accepted by the American people who, in times of crises, have proven themselves more concerned with tangible measures to meet the crises than with theoretical questions of the location of power.

The United States began its national career as a loose confederacy of supposedly sovereign states; a little more than a century and a half later it had been transformed into a strong federal republic. This had been a continuous process demanded by the increasing complexity of the issues which the government had to face and the inability of individual states to resolve these issues satisfactorily. The gradual shift of power was greatly accelerated during each of three major crises in the history of the nation: 1787–1789; 1861–1870; 1933–1940. The erosion of state powers was viewed by many with regret or misgivings. Except for the single tragic instance of the Civil War, however, it was a peaceful revolution which was accepted by the majority; indeed the growth of federal authority after 1933 was a response to a widespread public demand for action by the central government.

This notable experiment in federalism, probably the most impressive in all history, was conducted in a favorable environment. The people of the American states spoke a common language; a very large majority of the generation which won independence en-

joyed a common cultural heritage; the individual colonies before 1776 had shared in common the legal system of England and had passed through similar political experiences. The original states had been relatively small and they occupied a small and compact area. The original states had never actually achieved full sovereignty; they were united before they became states. Of the states which have been added to the union since 1789, only two—Texas and Hawaii—have ever been sovereign independent nations. Furthermore, in every generation the American people have been convinced that that United States had a great national destiny which could be achieved only by national effort, not by the individual states. In an intangible manner, this sense of destiny has been as important as constitutions and political achievements in enhancing the prestige of the federal government.

The United States and the United Nations

There are striking similarities in the immediate origins of the United States and the United Nations. Each began as a league of states at war against a common enemy and fighting, as they were convinced in defense of freedom and against tyranny. In each case, the first objective of the cooperating states was to win a war. The United States and the United Nations were alike established by states jealous of their individual sovereignties and determined to protect local interests. Both included, though to varying degrees, states which lacked full confidence in the good faith of other members of the confederacy. In both the United States and the United Nations there was a recognition of the hard fact that the ultimate success of their common interests required some degree of cooperation after the close of the war.

Within both, there were regional groupings which provide a natural nucleus for the emergence of regional alliances representing regional interests, with the ever present danger that such an emphasis upon regionalism might threaten the permanence of the larger federation. Within all the founding states of the United States in 1776 and of the United Nations in 1945, there were powerful groups which wished to preserve local sovereignty and were fearful of the dangers in-

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"There is every reason to believe that the ultimate global ambitions of the present Soviet regime . . . reject federalism, and envisage a unitary, centralist world state," writes this specialist, who notes that "If the Russian leaders could have their way, it would also doubtless be a Russian-dominated or Russified unitary world state."

Global Implications of Soviet Federalism

BY ELLIOT R. GOODMAN

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ARTICLE 13 of the Soviet Constitution states that "the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a federal state." Yet federalism has always been the step-child of Soviet politics.

Lenin's earliest commentary on a state organized upon federalist principles was wholly negative. In 1903 he admonished the Armenian Social Democrats to "remove from their program the demand for a *federal* republic." Stalin similarly rejected the proposal advanced in the early 1900's by some of his fellow Georgian Social Democrats for the transformation of Imperial Russia, following the downfall of the autocracy, into a federal structure.

Those who advocated federalism did so in the hope of solving the acute nationality problem in the Russian Empire by providing a framework for the national development of the non-Russian peoples. But to Lenin and Stalin, a federal constitution would only strengthen nationalism, which was assumed

to be the product of the capitalist stage of historical development. Proletarian rule, they reasoned, would transcend bourgeois nationalism and its typical political entity of the nation-state. The economic forces of capitalism had prepared the groundwork for world socialism by creating a single, interdependent world economy, which the proletariat would shape along centralist, not federalist lines.

As Lenin repeatedly explained, he did not dream of "an economically atomized world," nor did he "cherish the ideal of small states." The proletariat must look forward to a state form in which the workers of all nations would be organized in a way that would facilitate the operation of a highly integrated, highly centralized economy, unencumbered by the disintegrative pulls of separate nationalism. "It stands to reason," Lenin remarked in 1913, that "Marxists are hostile to federation and decentralization." Or again, writing in 1913, Lenin insisted that when viewed in its historical perspective, "the large, centralized state is an immense historical step forward from the dispersal of political power in feudal times to the future socialist unity of the whole world." To introduce federalism would be to encourage nationalism and to turn backward the wheel of history.

At this period Lenin was so hostile to what he called "the philistine ideal of federation," that he sought to define it into oblivion. "Federation," he said, "is a union of equals, a union demanding general agreement. Under these conditions, how can one side ex-

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pect that the other side will always agree with it? This is absurd." And elsewhere: "The right to federation is, in general, an absurdity, as federation is a two-sided agreement."

Whether he realized it or not, Lenin was actually defining a league structure, in which each sovereign state holds a veto power over every act, so that any positive accomplishment is dependent upon the general and continual agreement of the freely contracting parties. Such a condition does not prevail in a federal structure where certain matters of overriding importance fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government, which is free to act, unimpeded by the veto of the contracting states, while other matters are placed under the jurisdiction of the constituent parts. Apparently the very idea of a division of authority was so repulsive to Lenin that he had either erected a mental block against it, and so entirely failed to understand it, or he purposely exaggerated the weakness inherent in a federal delimitation of authority, in order to ridicule and discredit the idea of federation.

Stalin's understanding, or misunderstanding, of federalism was equally appalling. In an essay of March, 1917, in which he traced the origin and development of the federal government of the United States, Stalin offered this rather startling account. American federalism arose, he said, when

in the sixties of the nineteenth century a break in the political life of the country occurred; the northern states demanded a closer political union in spite of the protests of "centralism" from the southern states, which reflected the old order. The "Civil War" broke out and the North won. A *federation* was created in America, that is, a union of sovereign states . . . but such an order did not last long. Federation proved to be just as transitional a measure as was confederation. The struggle between the states and the central government continued, dual power became unbearable, and as a result of further evolution the United States was transformed from a federation into a unitary state.

Federalism could be only a "transitional form," Stalin continued, "since the development of capitalism in its highest forms is bound up with the expansion of the territorial framework of the economy, and with it comes a centralizing tendency, which de-

mands not federation, but a unitary form of state life."

Centralism in the Party

The Bolshevik devotion to centralism and profound antipathy to federalism can also be traced to the organizational principle of the Russian Communist party. From the founding of his party, Lenin had insisted on a highly disciplined, centrally controlled élite of professional revolutionaries, an "enlightened" vanguard that could be relied on to define and interpret the single valid will of the proletariat. The workers themselves could not be trusted to perceive their own best interests, nor to have true insight into their class will. This will, Lenin held, was one and indivisible. Consequently, any attempt to articulate it in many voices could only have a divisive and harmful effect. The party, Lenin repeatedly insisted, was not a debating society that could play with "the toy forms of democracy." Lenin's party was conceived of in terms of a military organization, in which the "enlightenment" lodged in the tiny, central beacon of omniscience was passed down to lower echelons in a military type chain of command.

Just as the tangled nationality problem had raised demands for reconstructing state power on federalist lines, so too, proletarian representatives of various national groups urged the introduction of federalism into the organization of the party. But again Lenin held that there was only one valid class will for the workers of all nations, and that therefore federalism would be a plague. When first confronted with federalist demands in the party debate of 1903, Lenin retorted:

We must act as a single, centralized, fighting organization. We must have behind us the entire proletariat, without distinction of nationality and language . . . we must not breed estrangement and isolation and then have to cure an artificially inoculated disease with the aid of those famous "federation" plasters.

Lenin, and after him Stalin, forever remained firmly attached to a thoroughly centralist party structure. To this day federalism would be considered a treasonous concept if anyone would be so bold as to try to introduce it into the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

How then did federalism come to be ac-

cepted in the state structure of the Soviet Union? The overthrow of the Tsarist autocracy not only unleashed a social revolution, but many national revolutions, in the course of which the Tsarist Empire disintegrated into new, diverse national entities. As Stalin frankly admitted a half dozen years after the revolution, "the strength of the national movement was much greater, and the road to the unification of nations was much more complicated than had been earlier supposed." Under these conditions, the federalist device proved to be an unexpected boon, since "a whole series of nationalities in Russia," Stalin reported, "were, in fact, in a state of complete separation, and in view of this, federation became a step forward . . . to their drawing together, to their unity."

But while federalist forms were accepted for the Soviet state, these forms continued, as before, to be filled with the centralist content of the Communist party, which remained as the guiding core of power behind the state apparatus. A resolution of the Eighth Party Congress in March, 1919, drew a clear distinction between state and party organization principles. After federalism had been approved as the method for joining new states to Soviet Russia, the party warned that "this in no way implies that the Russian Communist Party in turn must be organized as a federation of independent Communist parties. . . . There must be *one* centralized Communist Party with one Central Committee directing the entire work of the Party in all parts of the RSFSR." Furthermore, the resolution noted, "at the present time the Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, and Belo-russia exist as separate Soviet Republics. For the present moment these are the forms in which the state has to exist." Even though the states in which the Communists had apparently succeeded in seizing power were still nominally independent, that is, even before they had been federated with Soviet Russia, the Communists of these non-Russian states remained firmly under the centralized control of a Russian-based Communist party. In the words of this 1919 party resolution:

All decisions of the Russian Communist Party and its directing organs are unconditionally binding upon all parts of the Party, regardless of their national composition. The Central Committees of the Ukrainian, Latvian and

Lithuanian Parties are accorded the rights of regional committees of the Party, and are entirely subordinated to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

This resolution is of considerable interest for another reason, since it clearly indicates that the non-Russian periphery must subordinate itself to the Russian center. With the passage of time it became increasingly evident that the federalist forms of the Soviet state were not only filled with a centralist content, but also with a *Russian* centralist content. Though the federalist forms of the Soviet state had been reluctantly called into being in order to accommodate the forces of non-Russian national movements, the Russian-based and Russian-oriented party increasingly imposed Russian norms on the non-Russian peoples, so that by the time Stalin died Russian chauvinism was rampant throughout the entire Soviet federation.

Russian World Federalism

What implications does Soviet federalism hold for the rest of the world? Here the Communist leaders have been obligingly frank. When reporting upon the impending creation of a federal constitution for the U.S.S.R. in 1923, Stalin emphasized the ease with which the Soviet federation could be expanded, and predicted that "the entire East will see that our federation is the banner of its liberation, the advanced guard, in whose steps it must follow." But the Soviet Union was intended to be more than a magnet to which the downtrodden nations of the East would be attracted to federate. The Soviet state, as Communist documents repeatedly affirmed, was itself the prototype of a world state, and was specifically designed to extend its federation until it embraced the entire world.

In December, 1919, for example, Lenin asked the Communists of the Ukraine to federate with Soviet Russia so as to "provide the toilers of the whole world with an example of a really firm union of workers and peasants of different nations struggling for Soviet power and the creation of a World Federated Soviet Republic." Or again in December, 1922, when discussing the treaty that would soon create the U.S.S.R., Stalin noted "that the new union state will be another decisive step toward the amalgamation of the toilers

of the whole world into a World Soviet Socialist Republic." Similarly, the program of the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928 advanced the slogan of "a federation of Soviet Republics of advanced countries and colonies that have fallen away or are falling away from the imperialist system." The various states, the Comintern program continued, will "join the growing federation of Soviet Republics, and thus enter the general system of the world proletarian dictatorship." It anticipated the time when "the federation of these Republics has finally been transformed into a World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, uniting the whole of mankind under the hegemony of the international proletariat organized as a state."

Since the mid-1930's the goal of a world Soviet federation has been maintained, but it has been stated in less explicit and increasingly devious ways, although explicit statements on this objective have continued to be found in Soviet pronouncements. On March 7, 1959, for example, Khrushchev speculated on the future shape of the world community in which nations would no longer be partitioned off from each other as sovereign independent units.

With the victory of communism on a world-wide scale, borders between states will disappear, as Marxism-Leninism teaches. In all likelihood only ethnic borders will survive for a time. . . . They will simply demarcate the historically formed location of a given people or nationality in a given territory. That this will be so is shown by the process going on in the Soviet Union, which is a multinational state.

The present federal pattern for the multinational Soviet state was again held up as a model for the amalgamation of all nations "with the victory of communism on a world-wide scale," when "borders between states will disappear." Khrushchev also spoke of the coming "consolidation of a single world socialist economic system."

Soviet theorists have recently given considerable attention to the nature of the future united world economy. Writing in the February, 1958, issue of the Moscow journal, *International Affairs*, E. A. Korovin lauded "the masterly prophecy made by Lenin when he spoke of a 'tendency toward the creation of a single world economy, regulated' in accordance with a general plan 'by the proletariat

of all nations' and which 'should certainly be further developed and fully consummated under socialism.'" The Leninist vision to which reference is made had been elaborated in the 1920 Theses on the National and Colonial Questions at the Second Comintern Congress. Here Lenin not only predicted the emergence of a single world economic system regulated by the proletariat of all nations according to one common plan, but also forecast the creation of a unitary, centralized world state. "It is necessary," Lenin insisted, "to strive for an ever closer and closer federal union, recognizing federation as a transitional form toward complete unity."

There is every reason to believe that the ultimate global ambitions of the present Soviet regime likewise reject federalism, and envisage a unitary, centralist world state. If the Russian leaders could have their way, it would also doubtless be a Russian-dominated or Russified unitary world state.

In the eyes of the Soviet leaders, their image of the future world society is totally incompatible with any other projects for supranational federalism, either regional or global, which have originated in the non-Soviet world. During the First World War, Lenin repeatedly attacked the suggestion that a group of capitalist states might form a federation after the war. In a discussion of the national question in March, 1916, he dismissed "the idea of a peaceful union of equal nations under imperialism" as an "opportunistic utopia." In April, 1916, he introduced a resolution at an international Socialist conference at Kienthal, Switzerland, denouncing as "a mirage" all proposals for "a United States of Europe, compulsory courts of arbitration, disarmament, democratized diplomacy, etc." Again, in an article of January, 1917, Lenin branded the phrases about "a federation of nations," which he said were "flaunted by bourgeois nationalists" as "disgusting hypocrisy." It was abundantly clear, even before the Communists seized power in Russia, that the Soviet theorists were convinced that only their kind of a world state was either desirable or possible.

Following the seizure of power, they have consistently rejected any suggestions that this world state might be consummated in any other form or under any other aegis. "The League of Nations," wrote the Soviet legal

authority Pavel Stuchka in 1926, "cannot be transformed into a superstate, or a federation of states, or even into a confederation, because of the irreconcilable contradictions among the different capitalist states that constitute the League's membership."

Russian Hostility to World Federalism

From the first days of the United Nations' existence, the Soviet leaders have not concealed their implacable hostility toward all proposals aiming to remodel this new world organization into a world federation. The United Nations had barely begun to function, protested a Moscow *New Times* editorial of December 15, 1945, when "certain impatient politicians" were already calling for its radical reconstruction into a world federation. But these non-Soviet spokesmen who demand "a 'world state' are least of all concerned to abolish the social and national oppression existing in the world today. The value of these widely boasted remedies is therefore nil." The only realm in which Moscow has consistently pressed for an ex-

tension of United Nations authority has been within those agencies dealing with the administration of colonial and trusteeship areas. In such instances, the transparent motive has not been to endow the United Nations with superstate powers, but to use these United Nations' agencies to exploit the cry of the dependent nations for self-determination, assume the mantle of leadership of the anti-Western nationalist movements in Asia and Africa, and thus exacerbate strife and hasten disintegration within the non-Communist world.¹

If the non-Soviet world wants to reduce the dangerous anarchy of the nation-state system, as well as make itself less vulnerable to Soviet power thrusts which thrive on Western disunity, it must begin by extending the federal principle to the like-minded democracies outside the Soviet orbit. In the first instance, this would mean working toward federalism among the mature democracies of the Atlantic Community.

¹ See Elliot R. Goodman, "The Cry of National Liberation: Recent Soviet Attitudes Toward National Self-Determination," *International Organization*, XIV, No. 1 (Winter, 1960), pp. 92-106.

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throughout the world, would outweigh the disadvantages.

But the timing of such a proposal from the neutral and uncommitted nations is of great importance. If put forward when the "Moment of History" arrives, it could exert great persuasive power. But these nations must be ready, when the psychological moment comes. Certainly, if they are to be ready they must soon begin to study the idea of such

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herent in a super-state. The United States and the United Nations were established because each, in its own generation, seemed necessary and not because there was any widespread dedication to a more inclusive loyalty. Some of these parallel circumstances were recognized by Franklin D. Roosevelt, and it was no coincidence that he christened the international organization he had done much to bring into being "the United Nations."

The advantages which contributed to the success of federalism in the United States would not be available should the nations of

an initiative on their part. Indeed, the writer has reason to believe that some neutral governments are already considering the implications of such an initiative.

If a better plan be found for persuading the nations to accept a dependable peace, let it be offered, and soon. The world needs it, for the danger is great and growing. But, failing a better plan, it can certainly be said that a plan along some such lines as the foregoing would exert great persuasive power.

Under God, it might succeed.

the world attempt to create a world-wide federal union. There may be no lack of crises to emphasize the desirability of more harmonious cooperation among the various nations, but even crises will scarcely offset the diversity of cultural backgrounds and the pervasive influence of existing nationalisms. There are a few regions where common language, common cultural heritage, and comparable political experience could be utilized to develop a regional federation. Judged by the experience of the United States, this type of regional federation offers the most promising prospect for an early extension of the federal idea.

The French Community and Western Security

BY CARROLL QUIGLEY

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A truly French policy would have as its first objective to seek conciliation between the two opposing blocs. . . . The moment it appears possible to organize co-existence between Moscow and Washington, it behooves us to do everything to obtain it. Humanity itself is threatened by the atomic peril. France's mission, therefore, must be to prevent the two halves of the world hurling themselves to death together. . . . At the same time, without ceasing to be members of the Atlantic alliance, let us organize Europe along lines which do not prevent such relaxation and which do not tear us apart. Above all, let us remain France, sovereign, independent, and free!

GENERAL DE GAULLE spoke these words more than six years ago, in April, 1954, but they remain, very largely, his policy and a policy upon which citizens from all parts of the French Community can agree.

To these citizens the world today appears to be broken into three blocs: the Soviet bloc running from Hungary eastward to China; the Western bloc (which we call the free world) stretching from Western Germany, France and England westward, across the Americas, to Korea, Japan and Formosa; and, between these two "nuclear" giants, a buffer fringe scattered from Guinea in West Africa, across the Arab states and India to much of southeastern Asia, and Indonesia. In this tripartite world the French Community holds a rather ambiguous position.

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On the one hand, the French Community has no desire to be conquered by the Soviet bloc or submerged in the Western bloc (which they are more likely to call the "American bloc" than the "free world," as we do). On the other hand, the French Community, both in outlook and in geographic situation, lies athwart the ill-defined boundary between the Western world and the buffer fringe.

To us the word "France" brings to mind only European France, but to the French, in aspiration at least, the word "France" includes France Overseas. The whole, which used to be called the French Union and is now called the French Community, runs from France itself across strife-wracked north Africa, the Sahara, west Africa, and tropical Africa to Madagascar. The small areas in America and the oceanic islands scattered in the Indian and Pacific Oceans are of only marginal significance in establishing the political orientation of the French Community.

This political orientation, which is determined by the main axis of the French Community from France to Madagascar, rests with one end in the Western world of free nations, but has its other, African end, potentially at least, in the buffer fringe of neutral states between the two great nuclear blocs polarized on the United States and the Soviet

Union. If the boundaries, still rather ambiguous, among these three great blocs of the earth are to be made clear and distinct, the French Community must either be torn apart or pass wholly into one of the non-Soviet blocs. In the latter case the African end is more likely to draw the whole Community into the neutralist buffer fringe than Metropolitan France is to draw the African end into the Western bloc. The withdrawal of Guinea from the Community into a neutralism, which, to some of us in the West, makes it look like a Soviet spearhead on the south Atlantic, shows clearly the disruptive influence which neutralism could play on the African end of the French Community's main axis. Unless, of course, it takes refuge in ambiguities.

An Ambiguous Role

It is indeed paradoxical that France, which has always taken pride in clarity and logic as essential elements in the French way of life, must now try to preserve that way of life by resorting to ambiguity. But it is a fact that the French role, which French leaders prefer to call "mediation," depends upon ambiguity. As John T. Marcus wrote in his book *Neutralism and Nationalism in France* (New York, 1958):

The nationalist concept of an independent France, which in the early postwar years had meant resistance to Communism, then [meant] opposition to Germany, now came to mean acting as a bridge between Washington and Moscow or as the mediator between the two blocs.

This role of mediator seems to most French leaders to be the only way in which France can maintain its own independence, and at the same time make a substantial contribution to the easing of international tensions and the preservation of the peace between the two blocs, and last, but by no means least, preserve the French Community. Such a role seems to lead inevitably to an increasing ambiguity, not only in the demarcation lines among the three blocs but also in the very nature of the French Community and even of the French way of life.

American public opinion generally assumes that France is a permanent member of the Western bloc and attributes any difficulties to temporary or personal differences. The French, on the other hand, have been

since 1946 concerned with two successive issues on which they have felt an acute lack of American support or understanding. Until late 1954 the chief issue on the French international agenda was security against Germany; since 1955 the chief issue has been the disintegration of the French overseas possessions, notably in North Africa.

In the former case, the Western Powers, led by the United States, overruled all the French desires one by one. These desires, such as a special status for the Ruhr and the Rhineland, permanent German disarmament, or exclusion of ex-Nazis from resuming their former dominant positions in the German economic system, were all rejected by the United States on the grounds that Western Germany had to be strengthened in the face of the Soviet threat. When France tried to compromise the issue by proposing a European international armed force (EDC) which would use German soldiers in small units and German officers in lower ranks, the United States sought to remove these restrictions. France struck back in late 1954 by refusing to ratify EDC.

The United States then went ahead to rebuild a new West German armed force of about 350,000 men with conventional weapons, an air force of about 50,000 men with jet planes, and a small navy. At the same time the United States, by its refusal to keep its own ground forces up and its adoption of "massive retaliation" against any Soviet attack in Europe, even with conventional weapons, seemed to the French to allot them a role in which massive bloodshed of French ground forces in a war to defend Western Europe against Russia would be followed by nuclear annihilation of France itself by Soviet counter-retaliation. This nightmare was in no way improved by the advent of nuclear tactical weapons for ground forces in 1954 and the subsequent American decision that such new weapons required more manpower than older conventional weapons so that the American reliance on French infantry to resist a Soviet attack in Europe was in no way reduced.

After 1954, French attention was shifted from the German danger and the Soviet threat to the disintegration of the French overseas political system. Tunis, Morocco and Algeria revolted, and the first two with-

drew from the French Union. It soon became clear that the United States, prejudiced by anti-colonial ideas of considerable antiquity, was opposing rather than supporting France in her struggles to shift Overseas France from colonial status to some kind of mutual cooperative system. This was made clear by public statements from American leaders, by American sales of arms to Tunis and Morocco when they had left the French Union, and by the United States refusal to vote against anti-French resolutions in the United Nations Assembly at the end of 1958 and again at the end of 1959. The last refusal hurt particularly, since de Gaulle had already made clear that Algeria would obtain the opportunity to express self-determination as soon as public violence and political disorder had fallen to a specified level.

To France it seemed clear that the United States was prepared to oppose or at least to ignore French interests and aims in Africa and at the same time to expect France to bear the brunt of any Soviet ground attack in Europe and to accept nuclear destruction in the Soviet counter-retaliation without having participated in the decisions or actions which led up to that fatal terminus of all Europe. Impatience at this attitude by both France and Britain led to their invasion of Suez in October, 1956. This was a last desperate effort to preserve their interests in Africa, which were being so rapidly eroded away with what seemed to them to be American acquiescence if not connivance.

The consequence of that act of desperation is well known and of great significance in revealing the weaknesses of the internal arrangements of the Western bloc. The French and British, under pressure of a Soviet threat of nuclear attack on Paris and London, had to break off their attack on Egypt just as the Nasser regime was tottering and had to do so because the United States government sent a protest of its own to the Anglo-French attackers and made it perfectly clear that it would not protect them, even against a Soviet nuclear attack in Europe itself, if they followed independent policies of which it disapproved outside of Europe.

Western Revision Suggested

In a memorandum, still unpublished, of September, 1958, General de Gaulle sug-

gested to Washington and London that the Western bloc undergo an internal renovation in which there would be joint tripartite consultation and decision in all areas, including Africa, in which they had concerns that might lead to acts which could result in war. In this way France could not be forced into war in Europe as a consequence of unilateral American acts in Europe or anywhere else such as, for example, in the Formosa straits. And at the same time the United States (and to a lesser degree Britain) could be forced into a joint responsibility for the decisions which are determining the future of Africa. This would make France an equal partner in Europe and presumably would reduce the irresponsible American sympathy with anti-colonialism in Africa and would, apparently, end American unilateral acts in Africa which redound to the injury of France and Britain, as Secretary Dulles' cancellation of the Aswan Dam credits to Nasser had precipitated the Suez crisis.

In the last two years France has, by a series of blows to the Atlantic Alliance, tried to force the United States to revise it along the lines indicated in de Gaulle's note of September, 1958. The French Mediterranean Fleet has been withdrawn from Nato control; stock-piling of nuclear weapons for Nato and the use of French bases for American missiles and planes within France have been cancelled, and the French, in spite of protests from all sides, have gone ahead to explode two nuclear "devices" of their own in the Sahara.

These "difficulties" with the French are usually attributed by Americans to a French inferiority complex caused by the obvious French weaknesses shown since May, 1940, or, in the case of de Gaulle, are attributed to his personal confusion between himself and Joan of Arc. But any fair and unbiased judgment of world affairs would show that the French, for 40 years, have had a higher average of correct judgments on international affairs than either the United States or Britain and that de Gaulle personally has been correct in his judgments on public matters with much greater consistency than any American statesman. That being so, the advisability of consulting with France before the United States takes unilateral action in the Far, Middle, or Near East or in Africa

could be conceded even on its own merits. At the very least, those who accuse the French of being "difficult" might well make an effort to imagine how France would feel if it came under Soviet nuclear attack because of an American unilateral decision to attack Red China in order to preserve Chiang Kai-shek's control over the island of Matsu; or because of a similar decision to land American troops in Lebanon in order to "preserve" the very dubious "democracy" of that country.

The last ten years have shown so many errors of judgment in American foreign policy that the French can hardly be blamed for asking to participate in such judgments in the future especially when their own lives and their own French Community are being jeopardized by these decisions. Failure to concede this can only lead to increased French independence in determining its own policies, and this is but another name for "neutralism." Following the collapse of the Summit Conference in May, 1960, the United States accepted the principles, if not the details, of de Gaulle's demands by agreeing to consult with France equally with England on all decisions which might affect the peace outside Europe (as well as within it).

There can be no doubt that France would respond instantly to any Soviet attack westward across the land mass of Europe. But, being realistic, the French do not expect such an attack. And being realistic they are made extremely uncomfortable by American talk about the "liberation" of Poland, Hungary, or Rumania, just as they were made uncomfortable by American talk of "unleashing" Chiang Kai-shek to attack Red China. The French know that the Russians can advance without war and do not need to make such advances in Europe, particularly when most of Asia and all of Africa is open to Soviet non-violent penetration. Such non-violent penetration in Africa is threatening not only the French areas there but also the other colonial and independent areas.

As a minor example of this the French point out that their efforts to hold Ethiopia for the West by preserving the integrity of the Ethiopian Empire are made increasingly difficult by British encouragement of Somali separatism which goes unrestrained by the United States and drove Emperor Haile

Selassie, in July, 1959, to make an unwilling pilgrimage to seek aid in Moscow. This visit opened Ethiopia to Soviet technicians and advisors and culminated in the Soviet-Ethiopia Pact of March 27, 1960, which brought the African country \$100 million in Soviet aid to be used for economic development. According to French leaders, episodes such as this could be minimized if the Atlantic Alliance, with *tripartite control*, were extended to a wider geographic basis.

The existence of Overseas France, particularly in Africa, is of primary significance in determining the French role in the security of the West. Here again ambiguity, which some would call neutralism, is an important factor. In order to maintain a political relationship between metropolitan France and the Overseas Community it has become increasingly necessary to make that relationship ambiguous. Failure to do that quickly enough has meant that the constitutional relationships between the African territories and France itself have changed almost as soon as the apparent relationship was expressed in words and written down. The effort to change the French Empire into the French Union in 1954-1958 was still incomplete when it became necessary to adopt a new direction called the French Community. But this new course had hardly been set when it became clear, chiefly by the withdrawal of Guinea from the Community, that it must be made looser and more ambiguous. In the course of this process, constitutions and statute laws have been modified, various administrative arrangements have been made and cancelled, "understandings" have been reached and variously interpreted, and the meanings of words themselves (notably "independence") have been changed.

Evolving French Federalism

When the Constitution of the Fifth Republic was accepted by the referendum of September 28, 1958, and went into effect on April 6, 1959, it provided a federal system by which certain activities were reserved to the central authority and others were left to the "autonomous" member states. The Community as a whole had the same President (de Gaulle) as the French Republic and a governmental system of its own made up of an Executive Council, the Senate of the

Community, the Court of Arbitration and various other organs. Certain key "Community" functions were reserved to France; these included foreign affairs, defense, currency, common economic and financial policy, control of strategic materials, and, with certain exceptions, higher education, justice, external transportation and communications.

Even before the Community was established, the preceding French Union had been disintegrating, and the process has continued. Indochina was lost in 1954. Morocco and Tunisia departed to independence in March, 1956; Guinea in West Africa was cut off in September, 1958, when it rejected the new Constitution. Cameroon became independent in January, 1960, and was followed by the other trusteeship, Togo, on April 27, 1960. Also in April, Senegal and the Sudanese Republic, joined together into the Mali Federation, obtained "independence." This last change, by establishing a relationship not provided for in the constitution of the Community, opened the gates to a flood of "independence" declarations. Madagascar (under the name Malagache Republic) obtained "independence" in April and a number of other members of the Community, including the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and Dahomey, announced their desire for "independence" in the near future (both subsequently modified this). The four republics of Equatorial Africa, consisting of Gabon, Chad, Congo and Central Africa (formerly Ubangi-Shari) announced their decision to seek "international sovereignty" in a joint association.

From this series of events it would seem that the French Community was disintegrating under the impact of anti-colonialism and native nationalism. But that is far too simple an analysis. This can be seen from a comparison of the experience of Guinea and of the Mali Federation.

When Guinea sought political separation from France by rejecting the constitutional referendum of September, 1958, its leader, Sekou Touré, undoubtedly intended to remain within the French financial and economic system and hoped to continue to benefit by the extensive French economic investment in overseas areas. Instead, Guinea was cut off from French economic assistance and had to seek such aid elsewhere, especially in

the United States and with the Soviet bloc. On a three-day visit to Washington, President Touré obtained little more than a cultural agreement (October 28, 1959), while a subsequent Guinean mission to Moscow obtained substantial promises including a loan of 140 million rubles at 2.5 per cent interest, a powerful new radio station at Conakry, a modern printing plant, a theatre, an institute of technology for 2500 students to be built under Soviet auspices, and a promise that Premier Khrushchev would visit Guinea some time in 1960. Obviously, the Soviet Union has decided to use Guinea as a wedge to extend Soviet influence in tropical Africa. Pessimists said that Guinea would fall into the Soviet sphere of influence, but others insisted that President Touré was shrewdly laying plans to use both blocs to his country's benefit. One fact was clear however: Guinea was out of the French Community.

The departure of Guinea may have been in accord with the constitution of the French Community, but the "independence" of Mali clearly was not. As originally planned, the Mali Federation was to have consisted of Senegal, Sudan, Dahomey and Upper Volta, but economic pressure from the wealthy Ivory Coast forced the latter pair to abandon the project so that only Senegal and Sudan remained. These two formed the Mali Federation with a Federal Assembly at Dakar and with Leopold Senghor of Senegal as President and Modibo Keita of Sudan as Prime Minister of the Federation. They formed a new political party, *Parti Fédéraliste Africain*, which not only controlled all seats in the assemblies of the two member states, but began grass roots recruiting in neighboring territories (especially the Ivory Coast), chiseling away at the older *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* which had made Premier Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast a world figure with a seat in the French cabinet in Paris and, recently, France's spokesman at the United Nations in New York.

Houphouët-Boigny has been leader of the group in the French Community which favored the French policy of gradual assimilation of natives directly into French cultural and political life, with a separate and direct connection between each territory and met-

ropolitan France. His own personal ability as well as his almost complete political control of the rich Ivory Coast Republic have given him great power and prestige. But the policy of assimilation, which the French themselves have advocated for many decades, has operated so slowly that the ordinary African native could expect to achieve political participation in determining his own affairs by this method only at the end of years or even generations of effort.

To Africa in a hurry, as it is today, this has decreasing appeal. But this decreasing appeal has been strengthened by each African territory's great dependence upon French investment for economic betterment. This investment, which amounted to over \$2.1 billion in the period 1947-1958, weakened the appeal of anti-colonial agitation for freedom, even after Guinea made the drastic break from the French system. While Houphouët-Boigny and Sekou Touré dramatically faced each other at the United Nations defending the views of assimilation and independence, Mali arose with a third possibility, federation. The federalist argument against Sekou Touré is that his method of individual territorial independence will lead to the "Balkanization" and impoverishment of Africa, and that Houphouët-Boigny's method of assimilation, with each African territory linked to France by a separate connection, would deprive Africans of political "independence" today and leave the large number of poorer territories in economic subservience to Metropolitan France. Mali argued that local federalization of territories within the French Community would permit pooling of local resources, avoid Balkanization, and provide immediate political independence, with continued economic and cultural co-operation with France.

In this dispute among the upholders of slow assimilation, federation within the Community and secession, the balance, during the past year, has steadily shifted toward federation. Two significant events in that shift were President de Gaulle's gracious acceptance of Mali at the Executive Meeting of the Community held at Saint Louis, Senegal, in December, 1959, and the announcement in February, 1960, by the Prime Ministers of Gabon, Chad, the Central African Republic, and the Congo Republic that they would fol-

low Mali's example and seek independence as a federated unit within the French Community.

The tide toward independence is flowing so strongly that it is difficult to say where it will end. Late in 1959, Volta, Ivory Coast, Dahomey and Niger formed a *conseil de l'Entente* to resist both independence and local federations, but on June 2, 1960, all four states demanded full independence.

Weakness of the Community

There can be no doubt rising anti-colonialism and native nationalism will continue to weaken the political bonds which tie the French Community together. The experiences of Indochina and of Algeria have shown that the Community cannot be held together by military power, because France no longer has such power, and both the United States and the Soviet bloc would oppose any effort to use force for such a purpose. It is almost equally clear that political or legal ties, however skillfully expressed or ambiguously phrased, are hardly worth the paper they are written on. It is clear that French constitutional change, however rapid, cannot keep up with the changes in the facts of political allegiance or alignment. The cultural link remains important, but it is not sufficiently strong to hold the French Community together. Assimilation was a noble ideal, but it remained too much of an ideal and never became sufficiently a fact. The overwhelming mass of native peoples in all parts of the French Community are still largely untouched by French culture or even by the French language. The educational process able to carry out assimilation to a degree sufficient to preserve the Community as a functioning political entity was too expensive in the past, and there is no longer time in the present.

These failures of the military, political, constitutional, legal and cultural links to hold the French Community together—failures epitomized in Algeria, where all were stronger than they are anywhere in Black Africa—leaves only the economic link. But it is quite clear that France cannot come near meeting the economic needs of its own overseas areas. In the past France has been providing, for investment in underdeveloped

countries, a larger percentage of its national income than any other country (1.5 per cent, compared to 0.5 per cent in the United States, and about 0.6 per cent in the United Kingdom), but this totals only about one-third of the amount which could be invested conveniently in French Africa alone. It is clear that France cannot greatly increase its own investment in its overseas Community. It should be equally clear that such investment must be increased if political and social disturbances arising from increased population, destruction of natural resources, inefficient exploitation, and the demand for a higher standard of living based on a more aware public opinion are to be avoided.

The economic needs of the overseas French Community could be met in various ways. Aid might come from the Western bloc, chiefly from the United States, or it might come from the Communist bloc, chiefly from the Soviet Union. It might come from some third source or sources independent of the cold war poles and neutral to their opposition; or it might come from some combination of these three sources (Western, Soviet, or neutralist). It should be evident that the security of the free world will be greatly affected by which of these sources is used. It will probably be less immediately apparent that France, in her desire to strengthen her links with the overseas Community and in her recognition of the growing and paramount significance of the economic link, will be driven to accept supplementary funds for overseas investment from any source free from political ties, whatever the indirect influence that acceptance may have on the conflicting forces of Western, Communist, and neutralist influences within France itself.

As these problems are rising, metropolitan France is itself undergoing an economic change sufficiently drastic to be called "revolutionary." For the first time since the early 1930's the French economy seems to be moving forward, with increased production, high employment, and a sounder financial system than it has known in a quarter of a century.

Prosperity and Independent Action

This increased prosperity, of course, permits France to act more independently of either of the two polarized blocs and makes it possible to increase the absolute value of

its own investment in the Overseas Community. At the same time, this prosperity permits France to advance with confidence toward the economic integration provided by the European Common Market ("The Six") agreed on by the treaty signed in Rome in March, 1957. This agreement bound France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg to abolish their internal trade barriers, by stages, within 15 years, and to establish a uniform tariff against the outside world.

More significant for our purpose is the Common Development Fund for Overseas Areas to which all members contribute and which should total \$580 million in the first five years. Much of this will go to Overseas France. There can be no doubt, in view of the great prosperity of the areas within the Common Market and the very favorable balance of trade of this area built up by exports of automobiles like Volkswagen, Dauphine, or Fiat, that this investment fund will be available.

Generally, Americans have felt that every effort should be made to draw neutral nations to our side in the cold war struggle. It is now beginning to become clearer that a much greater contribution to peace can be made, in most cases, by increasing the prosperity and strength of the neutral states of the buffer fringe independent of their political alignment. As an ally of the West, France can make only a slight contribution to the West toward maintaining peace or toward assistance in war. As a member of the buffer fringe, French military forces would still resist any Soviet invasion of Western Europe and could make a very considerable contribution toward maintaining peace by balancing the buffer fringe between the two poles of American and Soviet power. The Soviet bloc has learned in Hungary, in Tibet and in India that it cannot afford to use methods which will alienate the neutrals. Similarly the United States has learned at Matsu a somewhat similar lesson in favor of conciliation and moderation.

A strengthening of the buffer fringe would increase the reluctance of both sides to alienate its opinion. At the same time, it could demonstrate to the world that economic salvation can be achieved by some middle

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Noting that the federal process "seems to require three things: a certain minimum of common background and political tradition; geographical proximity; and leadership of a high order," this British authority points out that "The failure to find a federal solution for the Commonwealth as a whole was due to the lack of all these factors. . . . The same difficulties must be encountered in any scheme for world federation. . . ."

Failure of Federalism in the British Community

By GERALD P. DARTFORD

Author of *The Growth of the British Commonwealth*

GREAT Britain learned much from the American Revolution and the establishment of the United States, but perhaps the most valuable lesson for the future was the demonstration by the American union of the federal principle as a practical means of governing large areas with common problems but intense local feeling. In fact, it could be argued that the American Revolution itself was the result of inability, on both sides of the Atlantic, to work out a formal federal constitution to meet just such a situation.

In the eighteenth century the American colonies enjoyed a very large measure of control over their internal affairs and were jealous of any encroachment on their rights, either by Britain or their neighbors. On the other hand such matters of common interest as commerce (both intercolonial and overseas), defense against other European nations or serious Indian attacks, the post office, and foreign affairs were looked after by the imperial government in London. Until about 1760 this arrangement, essentially federal in practice if not in theory, was for the

most part tacitly accepted both in Britain and in the colonies.

The chance of translating this practice into a workable federal constitution was lost when both the mother-country and the colonies rejected Benjamin Franklin's enlightened plan for a "General Government," after its acceptance at the Albany Conference in 1754. This failure to grasp the realities of the situation was underlined by the inadequacy of the first American confederation, and it was not until the Constitution of 1788 came into force that a government was established to deal with precisely the same subjects formerly handled by the British crown—interstate and foreign trade, defense, the post office and currency, and foreign affairs.

The Dominion of Canada

It was perhaps natural that the first federation of real importance in the British Empire took place among the British North American provinces which were the close neighbors of the United States. We have become so accustomed to the wider application of the name Canada that it is hard to realize that until less than 100 years ago it applied only to the southern parts of what are now the provinces of Quebec and Ontario. Here already there were the two cultures, Anglo-Saxon and French, which still divide the Canadian people today. Stretching along the St. Lawrence River, from Montreal to the sea, were the old French

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settlements that Britain had conquered in the Seven Years' War of 1756–1763. Under wise but paternal rule, the French had become reconciled to the change of flag because of toleration of their language, religion and civil law, but they were becoming increasingly anxious for a greater measure of control over their affairs.

As a direct result of the American Revolution, the part of Canada on the upper St. Lawrence and the northern shores of Lakes Ontario and Erie had been settled by Tory refugees from the United States, the United Empire Loyalists. The demands of these settlers for internal self-government, such as they had been used to in their old homes, were irresistible, and in 1791 the younger Pitt wisely divided Canada into two provinces, Upper and Lower, and gave representative institutions to both the English and the French Canadians. This complete separation lasted for 50 years. At first it worked well, but after the War of 1812, in which both races rallied to the defense of their homeland, discontent grew rapidly and culminated in the rebellions of 1837 in both parts.

The solution of this Canadian problem on the lines of the famous Durham Report is justly regarded as a turning point in the history of the British Empire. For one thing, complete responsible government in internal affairs was given to the Canadians, and this model was followed elsewhere. On the other hand the two provinces were reunited, forcing the English and the French to learn to work together.

As time went on it became apparent that neither separation nor union was the solution to the problem of two communities, each of which clung obstinately to its own way of life, despite political and economic interdependence. Meanwhile, the smaller Maritime Provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island were considering the question of federation among themselves. The rapid westward expansion of the United States to the Pacific had also suggested to Canadians a similar destiny for British North America in the western wilderness, then under the political control of the Hudson Bay Company. A wider nationalism stirred all Canadians; this Georges Cartier summed up in the words, "Shall we be content to

maintain a provincial existence, when by combining together we could become a great nation?"

In this spirit the Canadian government, with the active support of the Colonial Office in Britain, invited the Maritime Provinces to join them in a larger conference at Quebec to work out a closer union for all the self-governing British colonies in North America. This was to prove a meeting second only in importance for the continent to that which had produced, nearly 80 years before, the Constitution of the United States. It says much for the strength of the federal principle, then being so severely tested in the Civil War, that the fathers of the Canadian confederation borrowed so much in 1864 from the American system. The division of powers between the provinces and the central government, the bicameral legislature representing the people and the states, and the establishment of a Supreme Court are all to be found in the British North America Act which set up the Dominion of Canada.

On the other hand, the Canadians were careful to avoid any question of the final authority of the central government being challenged by the provinces by arranging for the representation of the smaller provinces in the Senate by groups roughly proportionate to their size, by giving the appointment of the Lieutenant-Governors¹ to the central government, and by leaving all residual powers to the Dominion, instead of to the constituent units as in the American union. At the same time, the federal principle was blended with the British system of responsibility of the governments, provincial and central, to the lower houses of their respective legislatures. As in Great Britain, prime ministers and their cabinets are the leaders of the majority in the popularly elected chambers and can only continue in office as long as they enjoy the confidence of those majorities.

The original Dominion of Canada in 1867 consisted of the Lower and Upper Provinces (now renamed Quebec and Ontario), Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. In 1869, it acquired control of the vast western territories of the Hudson Bay Company, out of which the prairie provinces of Manitoba (1870),

¹ There are no governors in the Canadian provinces.

Saskatchewan (1905), and Alberta (1905) were carved as settlement spread to the west. The previously separate colonies of British Columbia and Prince Edward Island joined the Dominion in 1871 and 1873, but Newfoundland waited until 1949 before she finally became the tenth Canadian province. As in the case of the United States, federation proved to be the means by which a vast and newly settled territory could be given orderly political development.

The Commonwealth of Australia

The success of federation in Canada led many statesmen in Britain and her colonies to believe that it might also provide the answer to the problems of other regions and even to that of the central organization of the whole Empire. Speaking in 1872, Benjamin Disraeli lamented that the powers of self-government, so freely given to the more advanced colonies, had not been accompanied by the setting up of "a central federal council, an imperial tariff, and a common system of defense." When Disraeli became Prime Minister shortly after this, his Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, tried hard to promote a South African federation, but was foiled by the refusal of the Cape Colony to surrender any of its newly won self-governing powers. If this scheme had succeeded, the history of South Africa might have been happier.

A more obviously suitable field for federation was provided by the Australian colonies. Starting from small beginnings in a convict settlement at Sydney in 1788, British colonization of the Australian continent had proceeded rapidly in the first half of the nineteenth century. By 1859, five separate colonies, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, and Tasmania had attained full responsible government. The sixth, Western Australia (then known as the Swan River Colony) was in an earlier pioneering stage.

The Australians were almost entirely of British stock, so that there were none of the racial problems which made the political life of Canada and South Africa so much more complicated. Yet for a long time the Australians resisted any proposals for closer union because of the intense local patriotism found in each colony. The Australians were

lucky that they were left throughout the nineteenth century in the peace and security provided by the supremacy of the Royal Navy on the oceans of the world. They were thus able to settle their own affairs and develop their own resources with the very minimum of outside interference.

As a result of their isolation and self-sufficiency, they were fiercely jealous of their independence, and this jealousy even extended to their neighbors, for in the early days each colony centered round its own seaport-capital and was separated from the others by long stretches of desert and undeveloped land. So for long Australians turned a deaf ear to the well-meant urgings of Lord Carnarvon and other Colonial Secretaries, who wished to see them follow the Canadian example. As late as 1891, a federal convention broke down, but finally ten years later agreement was reached and the Commonwealth of Australia came into being on January 1, 1901. The factors which helped most to overcome opposition were the fear for the defense of the country in the face of German expansion in the Pacific, especially in nearby New Guinea, and the desire for a greater voice in foreign policy.

The federal constitution which the Australians drew up for themselves followed closely the model of that of the United States. The powers of the state governments are slightly greater than those of the Canadian provinces and include all residual ones not specifically surrendered to the Commonwealth. The principle of equal representation of the states, large or small, in the Senate was established, although it must be remembered that the Australian Senate is of much less importance, relatively, to the Australian House of Representatives, than its counterpart in the American Congress. The Commonwealth Prime Minister and his Cabinet are responsible to the majority in the lower house of Parliament.

In the states a similar system exists under the nominal headship of a Governor who (unlike the Canadian Lieutenant-Governors) is the direct deputy of the British Crown. No new states have been admitted during the 60 years since the Commonwealth was formed. New Zealand, more than a thousand miles away, has always been content with her own separate status, and, after

a brief experiment with a federal system of provinces, became a unitary state.

Other Federations

While Canada and Australia are the outstanding examples of federation within the Commonwealth, one does not need to go far to find others which show continued belief in the federal principle. In 1896, four of the Malay States under British protection established a federal government which paved the way for the uniting of the whole country in the Federation of Malaya in 1948. A federation of the four states of South Africa was proposed soon after the end of the Boer War, but the South Africans themselves went further in merging them into the Union of 1910 with a paramount central government.

Elsewhere a new use for the federal principle was found in countries which were too large and had populations too heterogeneous to be governed satisfactorily from a single center. Thus as the political structure of India became more complex, more and more of the powers of the central government had of necessity to be delegated to the provinces. So a federal system was, in fact, working even before it was formally incorporated in the constitutions of independent India and Pakistan. The same process can be seen in Nigeria, with its three autonomous regions and its federal government for the whole country.

Such federations, however, differ essentially from those formed by a compact between sovereign states, for the subordinate units are the creations of the central governments and are seldom able to arouse genuine feelings of local patriotism. The same sense of artificiality applies to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland established in 1953, but the British Caribbean Federation of 1957 is a long overdue development, uniting small but distinct and historic island colonies as an essential step towards the creation of a new, independent member of the Commonwealth.

The Idea of Imperial Federation

From time to time proposals were put forward for the creation of a federal system for the Empire and Commonwealth as a whole, such as Disraeli had envisaged. It was not, however, until the 1880's that the British

public was awakened to the extent and the gravity of the problems of empire by such works as Sir John Seeley's *The Expansion of England* (1883), and few statesmen had much hope that the bonds between Britain and the self-governing colonies would be enduring. The rise of imperial feeling led to a new pride in these connections and a realization of their value in the highly competitive era of rival world powers.

The year 1884 saw the foundation of the Imperial Federation League, largely through the efforts of William E. Forster, better known as the sponsor of the Education Act of 1870. The League advocated an imperial parliament to deal especially with defense, trade and foreign policy. Despite the support of prominent statesmen such as Lord Rosebery (Prime Minister, 1894–1895) and Joseph Chamberlain (Colonial Secretary, 1895–1903), imperial federation never gained acceptance as a plank in the platform of either political party, while the response of the self-governing colonies was very lukewarm. The latter were not prepared to do more than provide for their local defense, leaving the planning and the expense of the defense of the Empire as a whole to the government and taxpayers of the United Kingdom.

No colonial statesman felt enthusiastic over a scheme that would inevitably have transferred a larger share of the common burden to his government—an attitude that Americans mindful of their own isolationism will not find hard to understand. As a natural corollary the colonies accepted British hegemony in foreign affairs on the principle that he who pays the piper has the right to call the tune.

Within Britain itself the idea of imperial federation became involved in domestic disputes on fiscal and commercial policy. One of the main planks of the federalists was that there should be what Disraeli had called "an imperial tariff" to encourage inter-imperial trade. Some of the colonies had indeed already granted preferential customs rates on British goods, but Britain at this time was a free trade country with practically no tariffs at all, and she could not reciprocate without abandoning free trade, then almost a fetish to most politicians bred in mid-Victorian liberalism. It was on this issue of "Tariff

Reform" that Joseph Chamberlain split the Conservative party in 1903, and the youthful Winston Churchill crossed the floor of the House of Commons to join the Liberals. With the defeat of the Conservatives and of Tariff Reform in the election of 1905 the idea of imperial federation ceased to be a question of practical politics.

The Modern Commonwealth

In their rejection of federation at the center the British nations were showing their traditional distaste for formal constitutional documents and their preference for flexible political conventions and understandings. The constitution of the Commonwealth, like that of Britain itself, cannot be found in any one place and is, in fact, largely unwritten. Of central institutions there are practically none save the Crown as the Head of the Commonwealth, and this is now of real importance only to the older members mainly of British race. The real bonds are the common tradition of parliamentary government, similar methods for conducting the affairs of state, a belief in justice before the law, and the fraternal sense (not unmixed at times with fraternal irritations) of having grown up in the same family.

The nearest approach to a supreme federal institution has been the meetings from time to time of all the prime ministers of the member states for discussion and exchange of views. The first of these, then known as Colonial Conferences, was held in 1887 on the occasion of the Golden Jubilee of Queen Victoria. The meeting of 1907 was important as it put the business on a more formal basis and changed the name to the Imperial Conference. It also accomplished something for the defense of the Empire by establishing a Committee of Imperial Defense and an Imperial General Staff. Thanks to this all the British forces were able to enter the First World War with similar organization and equipment, although the burden of paying for the general defense still rested with the United Kingdom. The conference of 1911 is memorable for the scheme for a federal parliament put forward by Sir Joseph Ward, prime minister of New Zealand, and for the frigid reception it received.

After World War I a vital change took place in the structure of the Commonwealth

through the international recognition of the Dominions as independent nations. Each won for itself a seat at the Peace Conference and in the League of Nations, and was accorded the right to direct diplomatic representation in foreign countries. From this time the Dominions began increasingly to conduct their own foreign policy and the British Empire ceased in the eyes of the rest of the world to be one political entity.

This new status was defined by the Imperial Conference of 1926 as "autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any respect of their domestic and external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." This structure was formalized in 1931 by the Statute of Westminster, in which the Parliament of the United Kingdom renounced the right (long unused) of legislating for any of the Dominions, except when requested to do so. The conference justified its action in the following terms:

The tendency towards equality of status was both right and inevitable. Geographical and other conditions made this impossible of attainment by way of *federation*. The only alternative was by the way of *autonomy*; and along this road it has been steadily sought.

(Report of the Imperial Conference, 1926.)

The Lessons of the British Experience

The experience of the Commonwealth shows very clearly both the possibilities and the limitations of the federal principle as a means of settling the differences between states. It has had striking successes in uniting groups of small countries on a regional basis, and it may well have more to offer in this way. In such cases federalism has been able to appeal from a smaller to a larger nationalism, and the unions so formed have been successful because they are organic. Just as New Yorkers and Virginians could become Americans, so Frenchmen and Englishmen could in North America become Canadians, New South Welshmen and Victorians could become Australians, and Boers and Britons could become South Africans.

Yet this process seems to require three things: a certain minimum of common background and political tradition; geographical

proximity; and leadership of a high order which can inspire the widening of horizons, such as was supplied in America by Washington, in Canada by Sir John Macdonald, in Australia by Sir Henry Parkes, and in South Africa by Botha and Smuts.

The failure to find a federal solution for the Commonwealth as a whole was due to the lack of all of these factors. Strong as were the sentimental ties between Britain and the colonies they could not replace the new-found nationalism of the Dominions; the Empire was scattered all over the world; and there was no prophet whose tongue could overcome these obstacles. The same difficulties must be encountered in any scheme for world federation. Even its strongest supporters do not expect that it can create an organic union between democ-

racy and dictatorship, or between capitalism and communism. Federation has created nations by uniting sub-continental areas; but it has yet to span the oceans.

As far as the Commonwealth is concerned, federation of the whole does not seem any longer to be a practical proposition. Today British federalists have turned to the possibilities of a wider federal union of the Commonwealth nations with other countries that share their belief in a free and democratic world, looking forward, as Lord Lothian did in 1935, to the day when "enough citizens of national states, while retaining their full autonomy in national affairs, are willing to form themselves into a world nation for common purposes."² The vision remains and without it the people perish.

² The Burge Memorial Lecture, Oxford, 1935.

(Continued from page 107)

method between American capitalism and Soviet communism. The neutrals of the world are too poor to use American capitalistic methods to overcome their backward economic condition. They must also learn that the political and personal oppression associated with the Soviet or Red Chinese methods of solving this problem are unacceptable. With the help of themselves and the two polar blocs they should be able to find some third way which would relieve world tensions by weakening the dichotomy of the cold war and, at the same time, by increasing power and independence, would force both sides to avoid those rigid policies which could precipitate a war.

Politically the facts are already moving in this direction. Economically the situation is more hopeful than might appear at first glance because the great need of the buffer fringe is agrarian reform and adaptation of agricultural technology to achieve a greatly increased output of food and agricultural products. This is the area in which the So-

viet system is most clearly unsuccessful and the American one most spectacularly triumphant. The only problem, a fairly technical one, is that American agricultural technology, aiming at high output per man hour of work, is based on a situation of cheap land and expensive labor, while most of the underdeveloped areas of the world need an agriculture with high output per acre since they generally possess limited agricultural land and plentiful supplies of cheap labor. Here American capital and knowledge of agricultural techniques could well be adapted by France (whose own agricultural system is closer to that which the underdeveloped areas need).

In this way the ambiguity, once so typical of British political life and so strange to the French past, might well contribute to the security of the West and the whole world by maintaining the French Community (and thus the French civilizing mission overseas) and by reducing the rigidity of the opposing blocs in the cold war.

"... No longer can any of us become educated only in the old vertical sense of having handed down to us the collected knowledge of our elders. Businessmen, youth, college professors, and all of us must now learn better how to become educated laterally—that is, by the interchange of ideas and knowledge as the various specialists accumulate them."

—Harry A. Bullis, Chairman of the Board of World Brotherhood, Inc., in an address delivered on March 18, 1960.

Received At Our Desk

CAN WE END THE COLD WAR: A STUDY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. BY LEO PERLA. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960. 251 pages, \$4.50.)

The role of ethics in international relations has long been a concern of political thinkers. In recent years, the preoccupation with ethics has become a particularly fashionable intellectual exercise, dictated in part by a legitimate concern for America's growing unpopularity in world affairs, and in part by an attempt to explain the deterioration of American prestige and power relative to that of the Soviet Union.

The author is concerned with the existence of a double standard: one for national conduct, another for personal conduct. In this dichotomy of values he purports to see the basis for America's uncertain condition in the world today. To develop his theme, he skillfully scores point after point in his literary demolition of such categorized members of the power politics school of thinking as George F. Kennan, Dean Acheson and Hans Morgenthau. He also vigorously condemns those who maintain that the United States is always right, regardless of the shortcomings of its policy rationale, e.g., those who approve of America's need to maintain overseas bases along the periphery of the Soviet Union, but would be prepared to fight to prevent a similar move by the Soviet Union along the United States borders. There is merit to this criticism. But unfortunately, in an effort to make a point, the author has overstated his thesis.

Perla is right in holding that "we shall never be able to THINK ourselves into sacrifice, unselfishness, and self-denial." But his solution—"the establishment of an official judicial body of Supreme Court stature which would subject foreign policy to rigorous analysis to determine RATIONALITY, and even wisdom, as far as that is humanly possible"—

is inadequate to the demands of national need, for it in effect substitutes one intellectual panacea for another.

His chapters on "Moral, Rational, and Semantic Self-deceptions in American Foreign Policy" are interesting, stimulating, and useful intellectual correctives for the political gibberish put out by Madison-Avenue type national figures. But the reader seeks in vain for some specific proposals for concrete problems. A policy for the West still needs to be articulated.

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN
University of Pennsylvania

INDIA TODAY. BY FRANK MORAES. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960. 248 pages and index, \$4.00.)

The prolific Frank Moraes, editor of *The Times of India*, has written another gem. In this book he has undertaken a much needed critical evaluation of India's leadership prospects. One of the more provocative parts deals with his critique of Gandhi and Nehru. He acknowledges Gandhi's unique role in India's cultural, religious, and political development, but maintains that "had Gandhi lived longer it is not unlikely that the Congress Party would have split into two groups with the right wing led by Patel and the left by Nehru," because of Gandhi's approach, anachronistic by contemporary standards, to economic and social problems.

Nehru has long insisted that "progress can be accelerated only with heavy industrialization." He realizes that the caste system must be eradicated and that many traditional religious symbols, e.g., the sacred cow of Hinduism, must not be permitted to interfere with social and economic progress. However, Nehru, too, comes in for serious criticism, particularly for his failure "to build up a younger generation of leaders as Gandhi did."

Moraes' analysis of the political élite,

(Continued on p. 116)

World Documents

UNITED STATES DECLARATION ON ACCEPTING THE WORLD COURT'S JURISDICTION

On August 14, 1946, President Truman issued a declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the International (World) Court of Justice in the case of disputes involving the United States. This declaration originated as a resolution in the Senate; debate in the Senate centered around Article 36 of the International Court's Statute which provided that "In the event of a dispute as to where the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court." The Resolution when it came before the Senate contained a clause excepting jurisdiction of the Court from "disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States." This clause was further limited by Senate acceptance of Senator Connally's amendment to it, which added the phrase, "as determined by the United States of America." President Dwight Eisenhower and his administration leaders have supported the movement to rescind the Connally reservation limiting World Court jurisdiction. The declaration testifies to United States unwillingness to accept any supranational authority that would impinge on its sovereignty. The full text of the declaration follows:

I, Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, declare on behalf of the United States of America, under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and in accordance with the Resolution of August 2, 1946, of the Senate of the United States of America (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), that the United States of America recognizes as compulsory *ipso facto* and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in all legal disputes hereafter arising concerning

- a. the interpretation of a treaty;
- b. any question of international law;
- c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
- d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation;

Provided, that this declaration shall not apply to

- a. disputes the solution of which the parties shall entrust to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be concluded in the future; or
- b. disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United States of America; or
- c. disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before the Court, or (2) the United States of America specially agrees to jurisdiction; and

Provided further, that this declaration shall remain in force for a period of five years and thereafter until the expiration of six months after notice may be given to terminate this declaration.

Done at Washington this fourteenth day of August, 1946.

UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE

On December 12, 1959, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a

resolution creating a new Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The text of this resolution follows:

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the common interest of mankind as a whole in furthering the peaceful uses of outer space,

Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be only for the betterment of mankind and to the benefit of States irrespective of the stage of their economic or scientific development,

Desiring to avoid the extension of present national rivalries into this new field,

Recognizing the great importance of international cooperation in the exploration and exploitation of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Noting the continuing programmes of scientific cooperation in the exploration of outer space being undertaken by the international scientific community,

Believing also that the United Nations should promote international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space,

1. *Establishes* a Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, consisting of Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Poland, Romania, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Arab Republic, the

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, whose members will serve for the years 1960 and 1961, and requests the Committee:

(a) To review, as appropriate, the area of international cooperation, and to study practical and feasible means for giving effect to programmes in the peaceful uses of outer space which could appropriately be undertaken under United Nations auspices, including, *inter alia*:

- (i) Assistance for continuation on a permanent basis of the research on outer space carried on within the framework of the International Geophysical Year;
 - (ii) Organization of the mutual exchange and dissemination of information on outer space research;
 - (iii) Encouragement of national research programmes for the study of outer space, and the rendering of all possible assistance and help towards their realization;
- (b) To study the nature of legal problems which may arise from the exploration of outer space;

2. Requests the Committee to submit reports on its activities to the subsequent sessions of the General Assembly.

(Continued from p. 114)

the problems it faces, and its composition is excellent. There are informative, readable chapters on the Communist threat, the divisive forces existing within Indian society, and the essentials of Nehru's foreign policy. Under Moraes' pen, the turbulence and troubles of India come to life. This is a vivid account of a vital area of the world.

A.Z.R.

TRUMAN SPEAKS. BY HARRY S. TRUMAN. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. 133 pages, \$3.00.)

A former government official and practicing student of politics delivered three lectures on American government at Columbia University in April, 1959. The lectures dealt with the office of the President, the Constitution, and the danger of demagoguery which exists in any democracy. They were followed by an informal, lively "give and take" with the Columbia University undergraduates. The result is an interesting series of essays on American government and politics.

A.Z.R.

"Today at the level of global, nuclear war the United States is firmly committed to a policy of deterrence. Since the Soviet Union also possesses a significant nuclear capability, the combined policies are called mutual deterrence or, more dramatically, the balance of terror."—H. S. Aurand, Jr., *Guided Missile Designer, Technical Military Planning Operation, General Electric Co., April 1, 1960.*

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

Berlin Crisis (See *East-West Conflict*)

Conference of Independent African States

June 14—Delegates of the independent African states meet at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to discuss mutual problems and the possibility of building a working union. Attending are delegates from Ghana, Nigeria, Morocco, the United Arab Republic, Tunisia, Libya, Liberia, Guinea, Ethiopia, the Cameroon and the Sudan.

June 25—In its final session, the conference of independent states unanimously calls on its members to invoke strong trade sanctions against the Union of South Africa and urges that diplomatic relations be either severed or withheld. The conference also recommends establishment of a joint African development bank and a joint African commercial bank.

Disarmament

June 2—At the 208th session of the U.S.-British-Soviet conference on banning atomic weapons tests, the Soviet Union demands the right to examine the nuclear devices to be used in forthcoming U.S. underground nuclear explosions.

The Soviet Union presents to the U.N. a revised disarmament proposal. All means of delivering nuclear weapons are to be prohibited from the very first stage of disarmament and military bases in foreign countries are to be simultaneously liquidated.

June 7—The 10-nation Geneva disarmament conference resumes after a recess of 5 weeks. The Soviet delegate formally introduces the new proposal placed before the U.N. and cites the U-2 incident as a reason why foreign bases should be abolished.

June 10—In the first formal Western comment on the new Soviet plan, the United States delegate at Geneva says it contains "hopeful signs of positive movement" to-

ward Western positions. But Frederick Eaton warns that the Soviet plan is still far from acceptable to the West.

June 14—At the East-West Geneva negotiations on a treaty to end nuclear weapons tests, the U.S. invites the Soviet Union to send observers to witness next month's Nevada underground tests.

June 15—The U.S. charges at Geneva that the latest Russian plan for total disarmament would leave Europe at the mercy of the U.S.S.R.

June 17—The U.S. orders its chief disarmament negotiator to return to Washington immediately for consultations aimed at meeting Allied demands for new Western counter-proposals on disarmament. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*, June 20.)

June 27—In a surprise move, Soviet and 4 Eastern European delegates break up the East-West disarmament negotiations, in progress since March 15. The Soviet Union requests the U.N. General Assembly to consider international disarmament at its September session.

The U.S.S.R. rejects a U.S. invitation to send observers to an underground Nevada test. It also accuses the U.S. and Britain of stalling in the nuclear test-ban negotiations.

June 29—British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan urges Premier Khrushchev to reopen the disarmament negotiations. He terms "incomprehensible" Soviet action ending the talks just before the U.S. was to present its new proposals.

East-West Conflict

June 3—Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev at a Moscow news conference continues his verbal personal attack upon U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Vice President Richard Nixon and other U.S. leaders. He charges that the Western powers, particularly the U.S., are evasive on settling the German question.

U.S. Secretary of State Christian A. Herter expresses his "disgust" at Khrushchev's insults against President Eisenhower.

June 19—In Rumania, Khrushchev says that coexistence is the only possible course in international relations. While renewing his threats to strike with rockets any bases used by planes making unauthorized flights over the U.S.S.R., he emphasizes that above all he wishes friendship with France, Britain and the U.S.

June 25—Premier Khrushchev, warning that the West had better change its ways or get "its knuckles rapped," says he favors peaceful coexistence.

In what appears to be a rebuff to the Soviet Premier, Communist Chinese newspapers reassert a "hard line" policy for dealing with the west. (See also *China*.)

European Economic Community (Common Market, see also *Western European Union*.)

June 9—In the first serious negotiations between the Common Market countries and the European Free Trade Association ("Outer Seven") the two trading blocs agree to seek a product-by-product answer to the trade disruption that forthcoming tariff changes could effect.

June 16—British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd tells the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union that his government would consider "qualified" membership in the Common Market. The ministers direct the ambassadors of the 6 Common Market countries in London to confer with the Foreign Office on the British offer.

Organization of American States
(See *Dominican Republic*)

Seato (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization)

June 2—The council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization ends its sixth annual meeting in Washington. It reports an intensification of "Communist subversion, insurgency and terrorism in several countries of the treaty area."

United Nations, The

June 10—Argentina notifies the Security Council that it will bring the case of Adolf

Eichmann before the U.N. unless the Nazi is quickly returned by Israel. (See also *Israel*.)

June 26—At a ceremony marking the fifteenth anniversary of the U.N., former U.S. President Harry S. Truman calls for the establishment of an international police force and suggests that basic international conferences be held at the U.N., "the permanent summit."

June 30—World Refugee Year formally comes to an end. U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld says he is pleased with results so far achieved and observes that many countries will continue their own refugee aid programs.

Western European Union

June 2—Britain tells the Assembly of the Western European Union that it is ready to consider joining the European Atomic Energy Community and the European Coal and Steel Community. The Assembly unanimously approves a motion calling on its governments to examine the possibility of British membership in Euratom. Another unanimously approved motion urges the Council of the Union to see if an agreement can be reached between the Common Market and the Free Trade Association.

ARGENTINA (See also *Israel*)

June 13—President Arturo Frondizi begins a 30-day tour of Europe, leaving the armed forces to wipe out an isolated and unsuccessful revolt at San Luis.

AUSTRIA

June 25—Italy proposes to Austria that they submit their controversy over South Tyrol to the International Court of Justice.

June 28—The Austrian Cabinet authorizes Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky to ask for inclusion of the South Tyrol case on the agenda of the U.N. General Assembly. Austria charges that Italy is discriminating against the German-speaking population in South Tyrol.

June 30—Premier Khrushchev arrives in Vienna for an official visit.

BELGIUM**Belgian Congo**

June 13—The Belgian Resident Minister asks Lumumba, leader of one wing of the Congo National Movement, to see if he can form a coalition government.

June 16—King Baudouin of Belgium signs a decree in Brussels convoking the newly-elected Congolese Parliament.

June 17—The new Congo Parliament meets. Joseph Kasavubu, president of the Association of the Lower Congo, is appointed by the Belgian Resident Minister to form the first Congolese government. Minister Walter Ganshof van der Meersch relieves Lumumba of this task.

June 21—Lumumba wins his first test of strength in Parliament when his candidate is elected President of the House of Representatives. The Belgian Resident Minister withdraws from Kasavubu the mission to form a government and asks Lumumba to select a Cabinet.

June 24—In a compromise move, Kasavubu is elected chief of state of the new nation.

June 26—Meeting for the first time, Premier Lumumba's Cabinet votes to name the new state Republic of Congo.

June 30—King Baudouin of Belgium proclaims the independence of the Republic of Congo.

BOLIVIA

June 5—Victor Paz Estenssoro, president from 1952 to 1956, is elected president for another 4-year term. Outgoing president is Hernan Siles Zuazo.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS, THE**Canada**

June 7—In provincial elections the voters of Nova Scotia re-elect a Conservative government and indirectly give the federal government of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker a vote of confidence.

June 8—The Socialist government of Premier Thomas C. Douglas is returned to office for its fifth term in Saskatchewan. The Premier announces he will go ahead with establishment of a compulsory medical care insurance system, one of the major campaign issues.

June 23—The Province of Quebec elects a new government. A record number of voters defeats the National Union party, in power for 16 years, and gives the Liberal party, 50 of the 95 Legislative Assembly seats.

Ghana

June 30—At midnight, Ghana becomes a republic within the British Commonwealth. The former prime minister now becomes President Kwame Nkrumah.

Great Britain

June 20—In a White Paper to Parliament, the government announces it has abandoned plans to accelerate the building of nuclear power stations. Because coal and fuel supplies are readily available, it is decided to place orders for new nuclear stations at the rate of one a year, in addition to the seven power stations now built or in the process of construction.

June 22—The Labor party announces a new defense policy, advocating leaving the Western strategic deterrent of nuclear weapons to the U.S.

June 23—In a move to stave off inflation, the Bank of England announces an increase in the bank rate from 5 to 6 per cent and doubles the special deposits London and Scottish banks have to make with the Bank of England before making loans.

India

June 9—It is announced that India has purchased 29 transport planes from the U.S. under a provision of the Mutual Security Act. The "flying boxcars" are to be used to supply Indian troops near the Chinese border.

Nearly 1,500 Sikhs are under arrest in Punjab as demands increase for division of Punjab into separate states with Hindu and Sikh majorities.

June 12—Thousands of policemen in New Delhi battle mobs of Sikhs demanding partition of the state of Punjab.

Pakistan

June 21—In a nationwide radio speech describing the Second Five-Year Plan, to begin July 1, President Mohammed Ayub Khan urges his people to make a "most

determined effort" to achieve substantial economic progress. The plan calls for the expenditure of \$3.8 billion, and is aimed at increasing national income by 20 per cent, creating 3 million new jobs and achieving agricultural self-sufficiency.

June 28—Finance Minister Mohammed Shoaib says that except in a few vital fields, it is the government's policy to leave industry to private interests.

Union of South Africa

June 28—The government announces that 1,200 persons jailed during the state of emergency will be released within the next 2 weeks.

June 29—Reports from Johannesburg say the government has decided to impose severe restrictions on the 1,200 persons scheduled to be released.

June 30—Minister of Justice François C. Erasmus says that "only a percentage" of 1,200 persons to be released from detention will be subject to restrictions on their activities.

BRITISH EMPIRE, THE

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

June 4—The Dominion party Congress opens at Salisbury. Immediately disputes break out between those favoring secession from the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland if majority African rule is granted to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and those advocating a more moderate course.

June 5—William Harper, leader of the "secession movement," is elected president of the Southern Rhodesian section of the Dominion party, the official opposition party in the parliaments of Southern Rhodesia and the Federation.

Kenya

June 15—The government publishes details of its plan to open to African farmers an area of 12,000 square miles of arable land now restricted to whites.

CAMBODIA

June 5—A nationwide referendum gives a virtually unanimous vote of confidence to Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the country's political leader.

June 13—Sihanouk agrees to accept the newly created post of "chief of state," a position whose powers are not yet defined.

June 30—The Cabinet resigns. Sihanouk asks Pho Proeung to form a new Cabinet.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (See also *Nepal* and *U.S. Foreign Policy*, June 8.)

June 4—The government breaks its pledge to bombard Nationalist territory only on odd-numbered days and fires 500 shells on Quemoy in the heaviest barrage this year.

June 9—Reports reaching Hong Kong say the government has ordered stringent control on food grains to alleviate a worsening food shortage.

June 23—The Chinese Communist press reaffirms the government doctrine that the only road to peace is the road of class struggle against imperialism and capitalism. (See also *International, East-West Conflict*.)

June 29—Communist China declares that lasting world peace will come only with elimination of the imperialist and capitalist systems.

CUBA

June 3—The Moscow radio announces that Premier Khrushchev will visit Cuba. No date has been set.

June 4—The U.S. State Department formally accuses Premier Fidel Castro and President Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado of carrying on a "campaign of slander" against the U.S.

June 8—Castro describes the recent U.S. note of protest as "aggressive and written in crude language." He repeats his warning that the U.S. intends to launch an armed attack against Cuba.

June 11—The government seizes two American-operated hotels on the ground that the managers have failed to produce enough tourist business.

June 16—Two assistant legal attachés at the U.S. Embassy are ordered to leave Cuba within 24 hours. The Cuban government accuses them of "flagrant intrusion in internal affairs."

June 18—The U.S. expels 2 Cuban diplomats on charges of espionage, racial agi-

tation and other "highly improper" activities.

June 22—U.S. Secretary of State Herter tells the House Agriculture Committee that "this would be an appropriate time" to give the President authority to make cuts in the amount of sugar Cuba is allowed to export to the U.S. (See also *U.S. Government*, June 30.)

June 23—Premier Castro threatens to meet "economic aggression" by the U.S. with the seizure of all American-owned property and business interests in Cuba.

June 26—An explosion at an army ammunition dump shakes the city of Havana.

June 29—The U.S. accuses Cuba, in a memorandum to the Inter-American Peace Committee, of having contributed to tensions in the Caribbean by using lies and slander against the U.S.

The Cuban government seizes the Texas Company refinery when officials of the plant refuse to refine Soviet oil delivered by the Cuban Petroleum Institute.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

June 8—The Inter-American Peace Committee of the Organization of American States accuses the Dominican Republic of "flagrant and widespread violations of human rights."

June 9—Foreign Minister Herrera terms the O.A.S. charge against his country part of a campaign against the Dominican Republic that represents unwarranted interference in its domestic affairs.

ECUADOR

June 6—Former President José M. Velasco Ibarra, running as an independent, wins an impressive victory in presidential elections over 3 candidates from the traditional parties.

FRANCE OVERSEAS

Algeria

June 14—President Charles de Gaulle renews and clarifies his offer to seek an "honorable" peace with the leaders of the rebellion in Algeria. He guarantees them full participation in a future political settlement.

June 15—Algerian nationalist leaders meet in Tunis to discuss President de Gaulle's latest offer for peace.

June 20—Algerian Nationalist rebels agree to send a peace mission to Paris.

June 25—Peace representatives of France and the Algerian rebel movement face each other in Paris for the first time after 5 years, 7 months and 24 days of warfare. Both sides agree to maintain complete secrecy regarding their talks.

June 29—The preliminary peace talks end without a formal conclusion. Both sides reject suggestions that the end of the talks constitute a rupture, but it is hinted that the parties are far from reaching agreement.

June 30—Tunis indicates that Ferhat Abbas, premier of the Algerian Provisional Government, will not be going to Paris to discuss the Algerian question under terms outlined by the French.

FRENCH COMMUNITY, THE

June 3—Four more former French African colonies announce their intention to seek full independence within the French Community. The states are the Ivory Coast, Niger, Dahomey and the Voltaic Republic, presently autonomous republics within the Community.

June 5—Ivory Coast Premier Felix Houphouët-Boigny insists the 4 states will never negotiate agreements with France until they have first obtained their independence. This is the reversal of the formula followed by other French African states.

June 24—The leaders of the African states negotiating in Paris say that President de Gaulle has "agreed in principle" that the 4 states shall have full independence without first negotiating cooperative agreements with France.

Malagasy Republic

June 26—The Malagasy Republic receives full independence; the island had formerly been semi-autonomous.

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (EAST)

June 6—East Germany protests to the U.S., Britain and France against the alleged recruiting of West Berliners for the West German armed forces.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (WEST)

June 29—Finance Minister Franz Etzel submits a record-high federal budget to the Cabinet. The planned expenditures of 45 billion marks (\$10.7 billion) is aimed at controlling inflation and expanding overseas economic aid programs.

June 30—The governing Christian Democratic Union demands unqualified acceptance of its "aims and concepts" as the price for agreeing to a joint foreign policy with the opposition Social Democrats.

INDONESIA

June 7—Indonesia and the Soviet Union sign a contract for the construction of a steel plant on West Java.

June 9—President Sukarno, ignoring demands that he abandon his plan to install a hand-picked parliament, insists the new group, including 60 Communists, will be sworn in this month.

June 24—The government "advises" the 3-month-old Anti-Communist Democratic League to disband or face official action.

June 25—The new 283-member Parliament is sworn in.

ISRAEL (See also *Argentina* and *International, U.N.*)

June 5—At a hearing in Tel Aviv, Adolf Eichmann, former head of the Gestapo's Jewish section, is charged with "crimes against the Jewish people" and "crimes against humanity."

June 6—Argentina's Foreign Minister announces that Israel has declared in a diplomatic note that Adolf Eichmann was kidnapped from Argentina by Israeli "volunteers."

June 8—In a note to Israel, Argentina demands the return of Adolf Eichmann. The note says that if Israel does not return Eichmann within a week, Argentina will take the case to the U.N.

June 15—Argentina complains to the U.N. Security Council that the "illicit transfer" of Eichmann to Israel is creating "an atmosphere of insecurity and mistrust incompatible with the preservation of international law."

June 22—As debate in the Security Council begins, the U.S. endorses an Argentine proposal that Israel give "adequate reparation" for the transfer of Eichmann.

June 23—By a vote of 8-0, the Security Council asks Israel to make "appropriate reparation" for the unauthorized transfer of Eichmann. What constitutes appropriate reparation is to be decided in later talks between Israel and Argentina.

ITALY (See *Austria*.)

JAPAN

June 3—Massive student rallies are staged throughout Japan protesting the government of Premier Nobusuke Kishi, the new U.S.-Japanese mutual security treaty and the forthcoming visit of U.S. President Eisenhower on June 19.

June 6—As anti-government and anti-U.S. demonstrations continue, the Socialist party unanimously adopts a resolution demanding that President Eisenhower cancel his scheduled trip to Japan.

June 10—Stone-throwing demonstrators imprison White House Press Secretary James Hagerty, Ambassador Douglas MacArthur 2nd and White House Appointments Secretary Thomas Stephens for over an hour in their limousine at the Tokyo airport. After rescue by a U.S. helicopter, Hagerty says the violent anti-U.S. demonstration will not change Eisenhower's plans.

June 15—Following government assurances that President Eisenhower's forthcoming welcome will be free of disorders, 20,000 Leftists riot; nearly 500 policemen and students are injured.

As rioting in Tokyo reaches fever pitch in protest against the new U.S.-Japanese treaty, the Soviet Union formally warns Japan that ratification can lead to "dangerous consequences."

June 16—Eisenhower's visit is cancelled.

June 18—Attempts by Premier Kishi's Liberal-Democratic party to vote approval of the U.S.-Japanese treaty in the House of Councilors are blocked by Socialist members. Opposition Councilors forcibly exclude the government party members from the room where the vote was to have been taken.

June 19—As 300,000 demonstrators howl “undying” repudiation of the military alliance, the pact is ratified although the upper house has not voted upon it. An action of the House of Representatives becomes law automatically if the House of Councilors fails to vote on the measure within 30 days. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*, June 22.)

June 23—The new U.S.-Japanese treaty becomes effective with the exchange of instruments of ratification. Kishi announces he will soon resign.

KOREA, SOUTH

June 1—Former President Syngman Rhee’s Liberal party collapses as 104 of its 138 members in the National Assembly announce they have become independents.

June 5—The government indicts 23 officials under the Rhee administration on charges involving irregularities in presidential elections last March.

June 15—By a vote of 208–3, the National Assembly adopts a constitutional amendment that replaces the presidential responsibility system with a cabinet system modeled on the British example.

June 25—On the tenth anniversary of the start of the Korean War, North Korea demands that the U.S. and its allies withdraw from Korea at once. The U.S. delegate to the military armistice commission rejects the demand.

LEBANON

June 12—The voters begin choosing a new 99-member Parliament. Former President Camille Chamoun is returned to Parliament in one of the most orderly elections the country has seen in years. Elections will continue throughout the month.

NEPAL

June 27—Chinese Communist troops clash with a Nepalese border patrol in Nepalese territory. One native is killed and 18 have been reported taken prisoner.

June 29—Nepal protests strongly to the Communist Chinese government.

June 30—The Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry says it is “deeply surprised” at reports that Chinese troops killed and cap-

tured Nepalese citizens. An investigation has been ordered.

PHILIPPINES, THE (See *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

RUMANIA (See also *International, East-West Conflict*)

June 18—In a surprise move, Soviet Premier Khrushchev arrives in Bucharest to take part in a Workers Party Congress.

June 20—The third congress of the Rumanian Workers party opens with a 5-hour address by party leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej.

June 22—Premier Khrushchev and party secretaries from Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary and East Germany address the Congress of the Rumanian Workers party. All back the doctrine of coexistence and maintain that war is not inevitable. The Peking delegate avoids mention of peaceful coexistence.

June 24—The party congress elects President Ion Gheorghe Maurer to the Politburo in place of Constantin Parvulescu, and Gheorghiu-Dej is re-elected first secretary.

June 25—In its closing session, the party congress adopts a 6-year and a 15-year economic plan.

June 26—The gathering of East European Communist leaders ends with the close of the party congress. They and party delegates support altering classic Communist theory to provide the ideological basis for peaceful coexistence.

SOMALIA

June 30—At midnight, this former Italian trusteeship territory becomes an independent republic. Its union with the new state of Somaliland will be ratified shortly.

SOMALILAND

June 26—The former protectorate of Britain becomes an independent republic.

June 29—The new government announces that South Africa, because of its racial policy, will be excluded from Commonwealth countries enjoying a 15 per cent preferential tariff.

SPAIN

June 8—Spain adopts her first new tariff law in 38 years. In return for membership in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and for receiving \$400 million in aid from Western nations, Spain has agreed to start lifting controls on her trade and replace them with a single tariff. The average duty climbs from 9 to 24.5 per cent.

June 13—In a letter to their Bishops, 342 Basque priests protest police brutality to political prisoners and violation of civil rights.

June 15—The Cabinet sends to the advisory 558-member Cortes its new fiscal measures to develop "popular capitalism." The proposals will earmark 3 sets of existing taxes for 4 specific social goals.

THAILAND (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*, June 28)

TIBET

June 10—Reports reaching New Delhi say fierce fighting has been raging for 10 days between Tibetans and Chinese Communist troops near the Nepalese frontier.

June 19—The International Commission of Jurists asserts that the Chinese Communists are guilty of genocide in attempting a systematic extermination of the Buddhist religion in Tibet.

June 23—Indian reports say heavy fighting has broken out again between Tibetan rebels and Chinese Communists in western Tibet.

TURKEY

June 1—The provisional government announces that all but 3 Deputies of the majority Democratic party of deposed Premier Adnan Menderes are under arrest and will be investigated for crimes against the state.

June 12—The Minister of State in General Cemal Gursel's government announces a provisional constitution to be in effect until a new parliament is elected. The document vests legislative powers in the 38 officers who led the May 27 coup against the government.

June 28—The administration of former Pre-

mier Menderes is accused of having failed to collect over \$1 million that members of Parliament owed state-owned banks for 3 years.

June 29—A 31-member High Council of Inquiry is appointed to investigate charges against former officials and members of Parliament.

June 30—Thirty-seven members of the Democratic party are arrested on charges of fomenting demonstrations against the provisional government.

U.S.S.R., THE (See also *Austria*.)

June 12—The Soviet Communist party publishes a strongly worded defense of Premier Khrushchev's policies against unnamed "Leftist" critics. The party maintains that policies of coexistence, summit meetings and tactical compromise with the West are not deviations from Communist doctrine.

June 20—A new agency with extensive powers over regional economic councils, the All-Russian Economic Council, is created to coordinate industrial management in the Russian Republic of the Soviet Union.

June 28—The Soviet Union announces it will start a new series of powerful rocket shots into the Central Pacific between July 5 and July 31.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, THE
(See *Yugoslavia*)

THE UNITED STATES

Agriculture

June 9—The Senate passes and sends to the House a bill cutting wheat acreage by 20 per cent but retaining present price supports.

June 15—Congress approves a \$3.9 billion farm money bill.

June 23—The House defeats the Poage bill to raise wheat price supports and cut wheat acreage. Earlier, on June 21, the House rejected the Senate bill to cut wheat acreage and to maintain present price supports.

Civil Rights

June 6—A circuit judge at Montgomery issues a temporary injunction preventing the Federal Justice Department from examin-

ing voter registration records in any Alabama county.

June 7—In the first move for the appointment of voting referees under the 1960 Civil Rights Act, the Justice Department asks the Federal Court in Louisiana to order back on the voting rolls 560 Negroes removed in a Citizens Council campaign.

The Economy

June 24—The Labor Department reports that the Consumer Price Index rose in May to a new high of 126.3, one-tenth of one per cent higher than in April.

June 29—The government ends its fiscal year with a budget surplus of \$500 million. This is the first surplus in 3 years and the smallest of the 3 surpluses registered during the Eisenhower administration.

Foreign Policy (See also *International: Disarmament and East-West Conflict.*)

June 1—Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hugh L. Dryden, the Deputy Director of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, says his agency was trapped in the original lie about the U-2 flight over the U.S.S.R. because of pressure to issue a statement before policy had been decided.

June 2—The Senate approves legislation authorizing U.S. participation in a new International Development Association.

Defense Secretary Thomas S. Gates tells Senate investigators that the top defense and foreign policy advisers agreed that President Eisenhower should take responsibility for the U-2 espionage flight over the Soviet Union. The Foreign Relations Committee concludes its 4-day inquiry into the failure of the summit conference.

Senator Lyndon Johnson makes public a telegram from Premier Khrushchev to 4 Democratic leaders accusing the President of wrecking the summit conference. Johnson says the Russian leader is trying to divide the American people.

June 6—Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, suggests that President Eisenhower postpone his visit to Japan because of anti-U.S. rioting in Tokyo.

June 7—Secretary of State Herter and the White House say there is no plan to cancel

the President's Japanese visit. (See also *Japan.*)

June 12—President Eisenhower begins his 23,000-mile trip to the Far East. He receives a rousing welcome at Anchorage, Alaska.

June 13—Ignoring an urgent plea from President Eisenhower, the House Appropriations Committee recommends a \$790.5 million cut in the Administration's request for \$4.1 billion for its foreign aid program.

June 14—More than 1 million Filipinos turn out to welcome President Eisenhower in Manila.

June 15—Speaking extemporaneously at a banquet and reception in his honor, President Eisenhower declares in Manila that war has become "impossible and preposterous."

June 16—In a joint communique, Presidents Eisenhower and Carlos P. Garcia, of the Philippines, emphasize the role of the Southeast Asia Defense Organization in strengthening the area and stress increased joint planning to strengthen the Philippines' economy and defense. The joint announcement says the U.S. will regard any armed attack against the Philippines as an attack against the U.S.

Both Democrats and Republicans on the subcommittee on National Policy Machinery join in endorsing 7 principles of intelligence operations. Although there is no direct charge that the Administration erred in its handling of the U-2 incident, the principles listed include some violated during the affair.

June 17—The House passes the foreign aid appropriations bill after restoring more than \$200 million which the committee had recommended cut and after opposing many recommended restrictions.

June 18—President Eisenhower arrives in Taipei, Formosa, only hours after Chinese Communist artillery rakes Quemoy with the heaviest barrage to date. He receives one of the most tumultuous receptions of his career.

June 19—President Eisenhower and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek end their discussions on the threat of world communism. The President then leaves for Okinawa, where he is greeted by anti-American and pro-Communist demonstrations.

June 20—Crowds estimated at 1.5 million

give President Eisenhower a rousing welcome at Seoul, Korea.

In a North Dakota farm speech, Vice President Nixon endorses creation of a U.N. pool of surplus food to feed the world's hungry.

Home from Geneva for new instructions, Frederick Eaton tells U.S. foreign policy and defense chiefs that the West needs a fresh approach to disarmament.

June 21—President Eisenhower ends his 9-day Far Eastern journey and arrives in Honolulu for a few days' rest.

Secretary Herter tells Senators there should be a return to "traditional channels and procedures of international contacts." He acknowledges that the size and violence of the Tokyo demonstrations against the President's visit had been misjudged.

June 22—By a vote of 90-2, the Senate approves the new security treaty with Japan.

June 24—At a news conference, Secretary Herter defends the recent conduct of U.S. foreign relations and says Premier Khrushchev has come close to interfering in this country's internal affairs.

June 25—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee charges the Administration with having mishandled the U-2 espionage plane incident at almost every important point.

June 27—Reporting to the American people on his Far Eastern trip, President Eisenhower proclaims the journey successful and valuable. He says his Administration will hold fast to its present course in foreign relations, and blames the Communists for forcing cancellation of his trip to Japan.

June 28—King Phumiphol Aduldet of Thailand is welcomed in Washington by President Eisenhower at the beginning of a 5-day state visit.

Defense Secretary Gates tells the Senate Appropriations Committee that recent Soviet moves demonstrate the "critical importance" of restoring the \$500 million for military aid abroad cut by the House from the mutual security bill.

Government

June 3—A majority of the full House signs a petition forcing floor consideration of a 9 per cent pay rise for over 1.5 million federal workers.

The House Ways and Means Committee approves a \$325 million federal-state program of medical care for the needy aged. The plan calls for federal grants to states to supplement existing public assistance programs.

Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Arthur Flemming orders an investigation by non-government scientists into charges that the Food and Drug Administration has failed to assure the safety and proper branding of new drugs. He also asks the group to review all approvals of drugs and antibiotics made by Dr. Henry Welch when the dismissed director was receiving large sums from antibiotic publications.

June 7—The Senate Antitrust and Monopoly subcommittee makes public letters showing that Dr. Welch, when director of the antibiotics division of the F.D.A., had solicited private business from the drug industry.

June 9—The House Commerce Committee approves a bill providing sweeping measures to tighten regulation of television and radio broadcasting. The bill would allow the F.C.C. to suspend a broadcast license or fine a station \$1,000 a day if it operated improperly.

June 10—A major set-back to the atomic power program occurs as the U.S. Court of Appeals rejects a license of the A.E.C. for construction of a nuclear station. The court rules that the agency, from the standpoint of public health and safety, was not justified in issuing a "provisional" construction permit in 1959 for a Michigan plant.

June 14—The House approves and sends to the Senate a constitutional amendment giving the citizens of Washington, D.C., the right to vote in presidential elections.

June 17—A bill to increase by 7.5 per cent the pay of 1.5 million federal employees is passed by the Senate and sent to the White House.

The Senate passes a federal housing bill after adopting an amendment providing for 25,000 public housing units, a feature not included in the House-approved measure.

June 20—The Senate rejects moves to repeal federal taxes on transportation, telephone and telegraph services. It also adopts

amendments ending the 4 per cent tax credit on dividends and restricting business entertainment allowances.

June 21—Dr. Linus Pauling refuses to tell the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security which scientists helped him petition the U.N. in 1958 for a ban on nuclear tests.

June 23—The House passes a bill for a limited federal-state program of medical care for the needy aged.

June 27—The Senate adopts and sends to the House a resolution allowing radio and television networks to give free time to major presidential candidates in 1960. The measure temporarily and partially suspends the "equal time" provisions under which stations now operate.

The House passes and sends to the Senate a bill to extend for a year excise and corporate-income taxes netting the government \$4 billion in annual revenue.

June 28—The House approves a bill to tighten the regulation of broadcasting and to outlaw "payola" and the rigging of quiz shows.

The House Rules Committee decides to postpone consideration of an omnibus \$1.3 billion housing measure.

June 29—House Speaker Sam Rayburn and Senate majority leader Johnson announce that Congress will adjourn in 3 days and reconvene on August 8 to deal with major legislation.

June 30—A wage-hour bill more limited than the proposals of House leaders and the Eisenhower administration is passed by the House. The bill would raise the minimum to \$1.15 an hour and would extend limited coverage to 1.4 million additional employees.

President Eisenhower vetoes a bill to give \$764 million in annual pay increases to 1.5 million federal employees.

The U. S. House of Representatives approves a sugar bill empowering the President to reduce Cuban sugar exports to the U.S. (See also *Cuba*.)

Nixon condemns the plan to recess Congress until after the conventions.

Labor

June 3—A 6-man arbitration board awards the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers a two-step 4 per cent wage increase.

June 6—In a wage dispute with Convair, machinists throughout the country strike at key bases that test intercontinental Atlas missiles.

June 13—The Labor Department reports that over 67 million persons held jobs in May, the highest total on record for the month, although 5 per cent of the labor force is still unemployed.

June 17—The Convair labor dispute is settled.

Military

June 16—By a vote of 85-0, the Senate appropriates about \$1 billion more for defense than President Eisenhower has requested.

June 22—In an unusual two-in-one shot, the U.S. places two satellites into orbit. An Air Force Thor-Able-Star rocket launches the two Navy satellites in "piggy-back" fashion.

June 25—As Senate-House conferees meet to iron out differences in defense appropriations approved by each chamber, Defense Secretary Gates requests that no changes be made in the Administration's request of \$39,215,000,000.

The Air Force announces the establishment of the Aerospace Corporation, a multi-million dollar, non-profit civilian organization to manage the engineering, research and development aspects of its missile and space programs.

June 26—Secretary Gates renews his appeal for congressional approval for a supercarrier. The House rejected the proposal but the Senate restored the necessary funds.

June 28—Senate-House conferees agree to appropriate money to construct a super-aircraft carrier.

June 30—Both houses of Congress give final approval to a compromise \$40 billion military spending bill. It includes \$661 million more than the Administration requested.

Politics

June 2—In a move viewed as certain to swing Michigan's 51 convention votes to John Kennedy, Governor G. Mennen Williams announces his support of the Massachusetts Senator.

June 8—In a sharp attack on Vice-President Nixon, New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller demands that he make clear

his position on national issues in advance of the Republican National Convention.

June 9—Nixon offers to submit to public questioning by Rockefeller on any issue on which they are in disagreement.

June 10—The Republican National Committee unanimously approves a resolution giving Nixon equal credit with President Eisenhower for administration programs and accomplishments.

June 11—Nixon tells Republicans they should discuss their differences over administration policies before the convention and then fall in solidly behind the party's nominee and platform.

June 20—Mayor Robert F. Wagner of New York City announces his support of Kennedy.

June 23—Adlai Stevenson calls on both parties to "keep Mr. Khrushchev out" of the presidential campaign.

June 26—The fifty-second annual governors' conference convenes.

Rockefeller declines to join other Republican governors in pledging "full and loyal support" to Nixon as the party's candidate for president. He says it would be inappropriate for him, as chairman of New York's uncommitted delegation, to sign such a declaration.

June 27—Kennedy appeals to every Southern Democratic convention delegate to support his nomination for the presidency.

June 28—Fifteen "liberal" Republican Senators issue a "Declaration of Purpose" hinting support of Rockefeller's economic policies but broad enough for Vice-President Nixon to support.

North Dakota holds a special election for the U.S. Senate. The race between Republican Governor John E. Davis and Democratic Representative Quentin Burdick is so close that results are not known.

June 29—Rockefeller declares he has no intention of bolting the Republican party.

Former President Truman announces his resignation as an at-large delegate from Missouri to the Democratic convention. No explanation is given.

By a vote of 30 to 13, the Governors conference goes on record favoring using the Social Security system to provide medical care for the aged.

June 30—In a North Dakota election viewed as indicating Midwest farm sentiment,

Burdick is the apparent winner with a margin of 953 votes over his opponent.

Democratic National Chairman Paul M. Butler flatly denies charges that he has "rigged" the convention to favor Kennedy.

Republican National Chairman Thurstont B. Morton says Rockefeller is giving the Democrats ammunition by his attacks on the Eisenhower administration.

Supreme Court

June 20—In 3 important labor decisions, the Supreme Court rules that arbitrators should be able to do their work with little or no interference from the federal courts.

The Supreme Court rules that the Civil Rights Commission can subpoena voting registrars and compel them to testify without giving them the names of Negroes who had filed complaints against them.

June 27—The Supreme Court holds that federal courts may not admit evidence seized by state officers in violation of the Constitution.

VENEZUELA

June 24—President Romulo Betancourt suffers light burns when an assassin's bomb explodes beneath his car. His chief aide-de-camp and his chauffeur are killed.

June 25—To forestall a possible coup, the government suspends constitutional rights of assembly, imposes a partial curfew and closes all airports. Betancourt accuses Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic of instigating the assassination attempt.

YUGOSLAVIA

June 3—It is announced that Yugoslavia will receive \$41 million in U.S. assistance: a \$23-million loan from the Development Loan Fund for construction of a chemicals and plastic plant and \$18 million worth of U.S. farm commodities to be paid for in local currency.

June 20—President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic ends a week-long visit to Yugoslavia. He and President Tito in a joint communique declare that the uncommitted nations should have a bigger voice in world affairs.

—Katherine Hammond, Associate Editor, *Current History*, 1952–1956.

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